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Unemployment Fluctuations Over the Life Cycle

Jean-Olivier Hairault∗   François Langot†   Thepthida Sopraseuth‡

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Abstract

In this paper, we document volatilities of worker flows across age groups using monthly CPS data: they are age-increasing. We then show that the search and matching model extended to introduce life-cycle features is well suited to explain these facts. Indeed, this model endogenously generates wage rigidity as the worker ages. With a shorter horizon on the labor market, older workers’ outside options become less sensitive to new employment opportunities, making their wages less sensitive to the business cycle. Thus, their job finding and separation rates are more responsive to the business cycle, as in the US data. The horizon effect cannot explain the significant differences between volatilities of prime-age and young workers as both age groups are far away from retirement. We show that a lower bargaining power for younger workers is actually sufficient to reproduce their age-specific business cycle volatilities. Finally, we show how the interaction between search effort and endogenous separations amplifies differences in volatility across age groups and helps the model match moments of aggregate data.

JEL Classification: E32, J11, J23

Keywords: search, matching, business cycle, life cycle

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1 Introduction

US labor market fluctuations actually hide a great deal of heterogeneity across age groups. This paper first aims at providing new empirical evidence on the business cycle behavior of unemployment and worker flows across age groups. We then propose a search and matching model with life-cycle features, endogenous search effort and separation to shed light on our empirical findings.

Average labor market flows differ by age, with a decreasing pattern in job separation and job finding rates (Menzio et al. (2016), Choi et al. (2015), Elsby et al. (2011), Gervais et al. (2012), Elsby et al. (2010)). However, little is known about the cyclical behavior of these transition rates across age groups. This study addresses this issue by documenting the patterns of volatility in job separation and job finding rates by age using monthly CPS data. The volatilities of separation and finding rates as well as unemployment display a significant age-increasing pattern: the older the worker, the more volatile the labor flows. We perform several checks to ensure that the stylized fact is robust. Beyond the unconditional dispersion, we consider the conditional variance, using the Impulse Response Functions to aggregate structural shocks of VAR models. Older workers business cycle responses are larger than their younger counterparts.  

We find that worker flows’ volatility differs across age groups, which calls for further analysis of life-cycle features. In addition, we also show that the cyclicality of job separation accounts for 30 (45%) of youth (prime age and old workers’) unemployment fluctuations, thereby suggesting that a relevant life-cycle model shall include endogenous separations.

We then propose a model to account for cyclical fluctuations across age groups. We consider the standard Mortensen - Pissarides (hereafter MP) model, augmented with life-cycle features along the lines of Cheron et al. (2013). We show that this model can explain labor market fluctuations by age-group. What are the economic mechanisms

\footnote{As in Gomme et al. (2005) and Jaimovich & Siu (2009), our empirical study suggests that old workers’ labor market fluctuations are more volatile than prime-age workers’. Gomme et al. (2005) and Jaimovich & Siu (2009) report a U-shaped pattern of fluctuations across age groups (fluctuations are highest for younger and older workers, and are lowest for middle aged workers). Our empirical evidence differs from theirs only on the youth labor market. This might be due to the difference in the data. While Gomme et al. (2005) and Jaimovich & Siu (2009) focus on employment and hours, we examine unemployment, job finding and separation. At the aggregate level, it is well known that employment is nearly as volatile as output while unemployment is several times more volatile than output. Our stylized facts underline that the discrepancy between the business cycle behavior of employment and unemployment also holds at the disaggregate level, across age groups.}

\footnote{The MP model is the textbook model of labor economics. It was widely used in applied macroeconomics: it was first integrated into RBC models (see Merz (1994), Langot (1995), or Andolfatto (1996)) and later in New-Keynesian DSGE models (see Cheron & Langot (2000), Walsh (2005), Blanchard & Gali (2010), and Christiano et al. (2016)).}
behind these results? The general intuition is the following. Due to retirement, old workers expect to remain for a very short time on the labor market. As a result, their current labor market status seems almost permanent: there is little room for future outside options as retirement gets closer, which tends to make old workers’ flows very responsive to current productivity changes. In contrast, for younger workers, with a long expected working life, many future search opportunities can be seized, which tends to dampen their business cycle response to current productivity shocks. More specifically, first, with Nash bargaining, wages are a weighted average of productivity, home production and future outside job opportunities (the "search value", or expected gains from search). Regarding the end of working life, we stress that the age-cyclicality of labor flows may be explained through the age-cyclicality of outside opportunities. The remaining time on the labor market is shorter for older workers, which makes their future opportunities quasi nil (they have no search value). Older workers’ outside options are then less responsive to the business cycle, because of the decline of their expected market value as they age (the "horizon effect"). Older workers’ wage are less responsive to the business cycle, thereby magnifying fluctuations of older workers’ flows along the business cycle. Secondly, this horizon effect cannot explain the significant differences between volatilities of prime-age and young workers because both age groups are far away from retirement. The lower bargaining power for young workers, consistent with their weaker union affiliation in US data, allows us to replicate the volatility of their transition rates. Hence, unlike Hall (2005) or Hall & Milgrom (2008), but in line with Pissarides (2009), our approach favors a Nash-bargained wage rather than an exogenously rigid wage that would apply in a similar fashion to all age groups. Nevertheless, these explanations of the volatility gaps across ages can be convincing only if the predictions of our model with respect to aggregate variables are close to 2nd order moments measured on US data. Given that the basic MP model fails to capture the salient features of the US labor market at the aggregate level, we show that an extended framework that combines endogenous search effort and job separation brings the model closer to the aggregate data, and helps the model explain differences in volatility across age groups.

Our quantitative results are obtained as follow. First, we use the first-order moments of worker flows to calibrate the model parameters. At the steady state, we show that age decreasing pattern of the job finding and separation rates lead to age-decreasing search effort, labor market tightness and reservation productivity. This underlines that

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3The MP model fails to explain the high responsiveness of job finding rate to the business cycle (Shimer (2005)), volatile job separations (Fujita & Ramey (2009)) and the Beveridge curve (Fujita & Ramey (2012)).
search effort and labor market tightness profile are both driven by the decline in the *search value* whereas reservation productivity is driven by the age-decreasing gap between the *search value* and the *labor hoarding* (the value of keeping the worker within the firm, given the expected future match-productivity draws inside the firm), we derive parameter restrictions that allow the model to match the observed age-decreasing pattern of the job finding and separation rates at the steady state. Given this identifying strategy of the structural parameters, we show that the model is able to match the age-increasing volatility pattern at business cycle frequency.

Our paper contributes to the literature that studies the pattern of worker flows over the life cycle (Ljungqvist & Sargent (2008), Cheron et al. (2013), Menzio et al. (2016), Gervais et al. (2012), or Kitao et al. (2016)). We extend their analysis by documenting the business cycle behavior across age groups using monthly data. Given that the MP model is not able to account for the observed level volatility in the labor market, adding an age structure in the MP model cannot generate by itself substantial volatility differences across age groups. Hence, we show that the unemployment volatility not accounted by the MP model can be important for unemployment differences across age groups. We thus demonstrate that the interaction between search effort and endogenous separations help the model fit the age-pattern volatilities. Moreover, we show that the complementary between search strategies of firms and workers restore the Beveridge curve in the MP model with endogenous separations. These results underline the complementary of two approaches discussed separately in the literature: the ability of the endogenous search effort to magnify labor market fluctuation, as discussed in the Gomme & Lkhagvasuren (2015), and the necessity to introduce endogenous separation, as discussed in Fujita & Ramey (2012). Our explanation of the cyclical fluctuations across age groups is thus more convincing because our model also matches the volatility of aggregate variables.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents workers’ transitions rates by age group and the age-related pattern in their responsiveness to business cycles using US data. Section 3 presents the MP model with life cycle features, and then examines

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4Gomme & Lkhagvasuren (2015) show that endogenous search effort exacerbates the complementarity between workers’ and firms’ investments in the search process. The intuitive view of a pro-cyclical search effort was first disputed by Shimer (2004), who uses an indirect measure of the search effort based on CPS data. Nevertheless, using a direct measure of the search effort based on ATUS data, Gomme & Lkhagvasuren (2015) find that search effort is strongly pro-cyclical. See Appendix C in which we argue that empirical evidence on search effort seems consistent with search effort dynamics predicted by the model.

5Fujita & Ramey (2009) show that changes in separations are not negligible and accounts for at least one third of unemployment fluctuations, but Fujita & Ramey (2012) show that the Beveridge curve is lost with endogenous separation in the MP model.
the theoretical age-pattern of labor market flows at the steady state and in response to productivity shocks. Section 4 applies the model to the data after calibrating its key parameters to match the level of transition rates by age. We also investigate wage fluctuations by age in Section 4.3. Section 5 concludes.

2 Labor market fluctuations by age

In this section, we use CPS data for the male population\textsuperscript{6} to study the age profile of transitions for 2 states in the labor market: from employment to unemployment (job separation) and from unemployment to employment (job finding). Using monthly CPS data between January 1976 and March 2013, we follow all steps described in Shimer (2012). We compute sample-weighted gross flows between labor market states and seasonally adjusted time series using the same ratio-to-moving average technique as in Shimer (2012). We correct these for time aggregation to account for the transitions that occur within the month. We then average the time series of these instantaneous transition rates for each age group on a quarterly basis to reduce noise, which gives quarterly job separation rates \( JSR_t \) and job finding rates \( JFR_t \), and the corresponding unemployment conditional steady state \( u_t = \frac{JSR_t}{JSR_t + JFR_t} \). In order to measure the volatility of these time series, we consider cyclical component of logged-data extracted by the HP filter with a smoothing parameter \( \lambda_{HP} = 10^5 \). In doing so, we follow the literature (Shimer (2005, 2012) or Lise & Robin (2017)).

We consider 3 age groups: 16-24, 25-54, and 55-61. Since we do not consider retirement choices in the model, we discard individuals aged 62 and above.\textsuperscript{7}

Levels of inflow and outflow rates of unemployment fall with age. Figure 1 reports the mean of the time series. Like Elsby et al. (2010), we find large differences in the levels of separation rates by age group. Young workers have a separation rate 2.82 times higher than that of prime-age workers. The average job tenure during youth amounts to 21 months (\( \frac{1}{1-e^{-0.049}} \)) versus 91.4 months during older age (\( \frac{1}{1-e^{-0.011}} \)). The differences in job finding rates are less striking but significant: the length of an unemployment spell is

\textsuperscript{6}Female transitions are also linked to fertility and child rearing, which we do not model here. We check in Appendix A.4 the relevance of our stylized facts on data with male and female workers.

\textsuperscript{7}In this model, we want to illustrate the effect of short distance to retirement on old workers’ business cycle response. We then define old workers such that the short distance to retirement is likely to be relevant. As male retirement age peaks at age 62 in the US (Gruber and Wise, 1999), we consider male individuals aged 55-61.
Figure 1: Job Separation Rate $JSR$, Job Finding Rate $JFR$, and Unemployment $u$ by age group: Levels fall with age, volatilities increase with age

CPS quarterly averages of monthly data, Men, 1976 Q1 - 2013Q2. "JFR" Job Finding Rate. "JSR" Job Separation Rate. "u" unemployment rate. "Std Dev": Standard deviation of logged HP-filtered data with smoothing parameter $10^5$. 3 age-groups (16-24, 25-54, 55-61). All moments are estimated using GMM with a weighting matrix corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using Newey & West (1987)'s method. 95% confidence band in shaded area. Horizontal lines are 95% band for prime-age workers. The comparison between the shaded area and the 2 horizontal lines allows to compare prime-age workers to younger or older workers. Authors' calculations.

2.6 months ($\frac{1}{1-e^{-0.49}}$) for young workers versus 3.6 months ($\frac{1}{1-e^{-0.33}}$) for older workers.

The levels of inflow and outflow rates of unemployment fall with age. As Elsby et al. (2011) stress for UK data, with faster exits from employment and shorter unemployment spells, youth face a more fluid labor market than their older counterparts. This faster exit from employment and unemployment does not appear when one simply looks at unemployment rates across age groups. In addition, the differences in job finding rates would actually predict an age increasing profile for unemployment. Thus, Figure 1 suggests that the high level of unemployment rates for youth is actually driven by their high rates of exit from employment. This is consistent with Elsby et al. (2011) and Gervais et al. (2012). The unemployment steady state is consistent with the BLS unemployment rate across age groups: 11.07% for 20-24, 5.17% for 25-54, 4.12% for 55+, and 6.46% for 16+. Source: BLS monthly SA data, 1976 Jan-2013 March, Men

The estimated means are consistent with the decreasing transitions with age found in the male population in Choi et al. (2015), Menzio et al. (2016), and Gervais et al. (2012). The transition rates in our data show higher levels than in their calculations because we discard labor market transitions considered in these studies (namely inactivity for Choi et al. (2015) and job-to-job transitions for Menzio et al. (2016)). Our results are not comparable to Menzio et al. (2016) because they restrict their sample to individuals with a high school degree.
Business cycle volatility increases with age. Figure 1 provides the standard deviations of logged de-trended time data. Older workers’ transition rates are highly responsive to the business cycle, much more so than young and prime-age individuals. The increase in volatility in the job finding rate is weaker for young to prime-age individuals (the volatility increases from 0.16 to 0.17) than for prime-age workers to older individuals (the volatility goes up from 0.17 to 0.22). This gap is statistically significant at the 5% level only between prime-age and older workers. Regarding the job separation rates, the volatility gap between young and prime-age workers, as well as that between older and prime-age workers, is significant. The cyclical behavior of the unemployment rate is also consistently age-increasing.

Robustness. The age-increasing pattern of labor market volatility is robust when considering alternative age-groups (Appendix A.1), alternative smoothing parameter for the HP filter (Appendix A.2). Moreover, they are also robust to the number of labor market states (Inactivity-Unemployment-Employment, Appendix A.3), to gender (transitions for men and women, Appendix A.4), or to the calculation method of transition rates (we use Elsby et al. (2010)’s publicly available data, they use the macroeconomic formula as in Shimer (2005) to compute transition rates, see Appendix A.5). We also check that our age effect is not a skill composition effect due to the higher proportion of low-skilled individuals in the population of older workers: the level and volatilities have the same age profiles within each sub-group, "High school degree and below" and "College and above" (Appendix A.6). The stylized facts remain robust: the older the worker, the more volatile the worker flows.

Structural VAR: The age-specific impulse response functions to business cycle shocks. Given that the model aims at explaining age-specific elasticities with respect to aggregate shocks, we are interested in age-specific labor market responsiveness to the business cycle. We then estimate structural VAR models and show that older workers’ impulse response responses (IRFs) of job finding and job separation to aggregate shocks (supply and demand) remain larger than their younger counterparts. In order to gauge the significance of older workers’ larger response to aggregate shock, we compute the prob-

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10With a smaller sample size each month than for the other age groups, the time series of the workers aged 55-61 can include a noise component. To deal with this problem, we estimate a structural VAR where IRFs cannot then be driven by noise, that is uncorrelated with structural shocks, by definition. Moreover, we restrict all the standard deviations of the structural shocks to be equal to unity. Hence, the size of Impulse Response Function are comparable across age-groups. See Appendix A.8 for further details.
ability that older workers’ IRF lies above the younger counterpart’s median IRF. Results are displayed in table 1. The results show that response of the job finding and separation rates to demand and supply shocks are significantly larger for older workers. Hence, beyond unconditional moments, conditional moments by age group suggest that older workers’ labor market fluctuations are more volatile than their younger counterparts’.

**The contributions of age-specific fluctuations to aggregate cyclicality.** In this section, we quantify the contributions of age-specific fluctuations to aggregate cyclicality using $\beta$ decompositions as in Shimer (2012). In doing so, we consider the economy at the conditional steady state: unemployment inflows equal unemployment outflows, such that

$$u_t = \frac{JSR_t}{JSR_t + JFR_t}.$$  

11

Transitions rates: We first consider the aggregate job finding rate and analyze whether aggregates changes are due to changes in the age-composition of the economy, or to changes in the propensity to find a job conditional on each age group. Using the log-deviation with respect to the mean, we decompose the change in the job finding probability due to changes in the age composition of unemployment $\beta^u_i$ and changes due to changes in the job finding probability for each age-group $\beta^{JFR}_i$. We repeat the exercise for the aggregate separation rate, with $\beta^n_i$ and $\beta^{JSR}_i$. Table 2 displays the results. As in Shimer (2012), we find that observable changes in workers’ age composition explain little of the overall fluctuations in the job finding probability ($\beta^u_i$ and $\beta^n_i$ are not significantly different from zero). Virtually all of the change in the job finding probability is driven by the cyclicity of age-specific unemployment outflows ($\beta^{JFR}_i$). The same comment applies to job separation rate $\beta^{JSR}_i$. This calls for a further understanding of age-specific cyclicality of ins and outs of unemployment. This paper aims at filling this gap.

Table 2 suggests that the cyclicality of ins and outs of unemployment from prime-age workers drive more than half of aggregate fluctuations of JFR and JSR. Fluctuations on

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supply shock</th>
<th>Demand shock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young Prime age</td>
<td>Young Prime age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFR</td>
<td>0.67 0.76$^a$</td>
<td>0.68 0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>0.72 0.65</td>
<td>0.77 0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$: Following a supply shock, 76% of old workers’ IRF of JFR lie above median JFR IRF of prime age workers, 1 quarter after the shock.
Table 2: Contribution of each age group to fluctuations in aggregate job flows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group $i$</th>
<th>Changes in transitions rates</th>
<th>Changes in age composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16-24</td>
<td>25-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{JFR}^i$</td>
<td>0.3575$^*$ (a)</td>
<td>0.5263$^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{JSR}^i$</td>
<td>0.2472$^*$</td>
<td>0.6737$^{**}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_i$</td>
<td>0.3918</td>
<td>0.5312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- $\beta_{JFR}^i$: contribution of changes in Job Finding Rate of age group $i$ in aggregate fluctuations of Job Finding Rate. Similarly for the Job Separation Rate, $\beta_{JSR}^i$.
- $p_i = \frac{JFR_i (u_i / u)}{JFR}$ share of JFR of age group $i$ in total JFR. As we consider the economy at the conditional steady state (unemployment ins equal unemployment outs), $p_i = \frac{JSR_i (n_i / n)}{JSR}$ is also the share of JSR of age group $i$ in total JSR.
- $^*$: Statistically larger than $p_i$ (with a 95% confidence level).
- $^*$: Statistically lower than $p_i$.
- $^{**}$: Statistically equal to zero.

(a): Changes in young workers’ JFR explains 35.75% of changes in aggregate JFR. This is significantly lower than their relative weight in worker flows (39.18%).

Unemployment : We then look at the contribution of age-specific transitions to aggregate unemployment fluctuations. Using a log-linear approximation of steady state unemployment for each age group, we first compute the contribution of ins and outs of unemployment of each age group to age-specific unemployment changes. We report the results in Table 3, rows 1-3. On the youth labor market, changes in job separation accounts for approximately a 29% of young workers’ unemployment fluctuations. The contribution of employment exits rises to 45% for prime age and old workers. This suggests that an empirically relevant life-cycle model should include endogenous separations. As the contribution of unemployment inflows is 45% for old workers, this suggests that omitting the dynamics of job separations in a life-cycle model would provide bad predictions on the cyclicality of old workers’ unemployment. Row 4 of Table 3 provides the contribution of changes in age-specific transition rates to the volatility of aggregate unemployment. The cyclicality of prime-age workers’ JFR alone accounts for 36.54% of fluctuations of aggregate unemployment. Old workers’ contribution to aggregate unemployment volatility is approximately 11% (5.58% from changes in JSR and 5.97% from JFR), while youth worker flows account for 27% of changes in aggregate unemployment.

Our empirical exercise shows that life cycle features are worth investigating as young and old workers’ labor market fluctuations differ from prime age workers’. In addition, a
Table 3: Variance decomposition of unemployment fluctuations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\beta_{Y}^{JSR}$</th>
<th>$\beta_{Y}^{JFR}$</th>
<th>$\beta_{A}^{JSR}$</th>
<th>$\beta_{A}^{JFR}$</th>
<th>$\beta_{O}^{JSR}$</th>
<th>$\beta_{O}^{JFR}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2943 (a)</td>
<td>0.7057</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4497</td>
<td>0.5503</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4580</td>
<td>0.5420</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.0731 (b)</td>
<td>0.1970</td>
<td>0.2442</td>
<td>0.3654</td>
<td>0.0558</td>
<td>0.0597</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subscript $Y,A,O$ relates to young, prime-age and old workers, respectively. For instance, $u_Y$ denotes youth unemployment rate, $u_A$ prime-age workers’ unemployment rate, $u_O$ old workers’ unemployment rate. $\beta$ is the aggregate unemployment rate. $JFR$ Job Finding Rate. $JSR$ Job Separation Rate. $\beta$ relates to variance decomposition. Example: $\beta_{Y}^{JSR}$ is the contribution of changes in young workers’ Job Separation Rate to labor market fluctuations.

(a) Changes in young workers’ JFR accounts for 29.43% of youth unemployment fluctuations.

(b) Changes in young workers’ JFR accounts for 7.31% of aggregate unemployment fluctuations.

Model focusing on prime age workers’ fluctuations would capture approximately 60% of aggregate fluctuations. We show that the contribution of youth labor market to aggregate changes hovers around 30%, with 10% for old workers’ contribution. Old workers’ contribution to aggregate fluctuations seem quantitatively small. However, our empirical exercise suggests that a representative model, by ignoring age specificities, would deliver a biased approximation of labor market fluctuations. In addition, we argue that old workers’ fluctuations are still worth investigating as they provide an interesting opportunity to assess the relevance of the short distance to retirement, thereby providing an additional opportunity to further test the DMP model.

3 A life-cycle matching model with aggregate uncertainty

In this section, we extend Mortensen & Pissarides (1994)’s model that introduces endogenous search effort and separation with aggregate shocks in a framework with life cycle features. We model the life cycle as stochastic aging, as in Castañeda et al. (2003), Ljungqvist & Sargent (2008), and Hairault et al. (2010). Unlike Cheron et al. (2013), we consider (i) aggregate shocks, as in Fujita & Ramey (2012), and (ii) age-directed search, as in Menzio et al. (2016). With age-directed search, there is no externality due to workers’ heterogeneity in the matching function. Following Bagger et al. (2014) and Menzio et al. (2016), we also consider human capital accumulation through a deterministic exogenous process. This allows the model to capture the evolution of wage over the life-cycle.

For simplicity, we discard job-to-job transitions (as in Fujita & Ramey (2012)) and savings (as in Lise (2013)). These extensions are left for future research.
3.1 Demographic setting and aggregate shock

The Life Cycle. Consistent with our empirical results, we consider three age groups, $i$, which is enough to describe the working-life cycle: young $Y$, prime-age $A$, and older workers $O$. All young workers $Y$ enter the labor market as unemployed workers. We assume stochastic aging. The probability of remaining a prime-age (young) worker in the next period is $\pi_A (\pi_Y)$. Conversely, the probability of becoming older (prime-age) is $1 - \pi_A (1 - \pi_Y)$. To account for the non-linearity in the horizon effect, the period as older workers is divided into $N$ years: $O = \{O_i\}_{i=T-N}$, with $\pi_O$, the probability of remaining in age group $O_i$ next period. With probability $1 - \pi_O$, older workers reach the exogenous retirement age of $T+1$. To maintain a constant population size, we assume that the number of exiting workers is replaced by an equal number of young workers.

More formally, we assume for simplicity that the matrix $\Pi$ governing the age Markov-process is:

$$\Pi = \begin{bmatrix}
\pi_Y & 1 - \pi_Y & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & \pi_A & 1 - \pi_A & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \pi_{O_{T-N}} & 1 - \pi_{O_{T-N}} & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\
1 - \pi_O & 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & \pi_O
\end{bmatrix}$$

We deduct the size of each group from $\Pi_{\infty}$, the matrix of the unconditional probabilities, given that the total size of the population is normalized to unity. We divide the population of each group into two types of agents: unemployed $u_i$ and employed $n_i$, such that $m_i = u_i + n_i$, with $1 = \sum_i m_i$. We thereby discard the participation margin. In our view, this is not a very restrictive assumption because we introduce an age-specific search effort that can converge towards zero at the end of working life (before retirement). These older unemployed workers with a zero-search can thus be considered as non-participants. Their number is endogenously determined at equilibrium.

Shocks. A worker-firm match is characterized by the aggregate $z$ and the match-specific $\epsilon$ productivity factors. We assume that the aggregate productivity component follows the

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13Our paper analyzes the effect of the short-distance to retirement on labor market fluctuations. The question is: at which age does the old workers' expected surplus start falling due to the short distance to retirement? At which age is an old worker considered as "close to retirement"? This is an endogenous outcome in the model. In addition, as discounting is exponential, the effect of the short distance to retirement appears in a non-linear fashion in our model. By considering this demographic structure for old workers, we let the model endogenously respond in a non-linear fashion at the end of the working life. We then aggregate all old workers to fit the age group of 55-61 as in the data.
exogenous process:

\[
\log(z') = \rho \log(z) + \nu'
\]

where \(\nu'\) is an i.i.d. normal disturbance with mean zero and standard deviation \(\sigma_\nu\).

For a common aggregate component of productivity \(z\), idiosyncratic productivity shocks hit jobs at random. At the end of each period \(t\), there is a new productivity level for period \(t + 1\) drawn with probability \(\lambda_i \leq 1\) in the distribution \(G(\epsilon)\), with \(\epsilon \in [0, 1]\). The higher \(\lambda_i\), the lower the persistence of the current productivity draw. The probability of drawing a new match-specific productivity may be specific to age \(i\). Firms decide to discard any job whose productivity is below an idiosyncratic productivity threshold (the reservation productivity) denoted by \(R_i(z)\). Unlike in MP, new jobs are not opened at the highest productivity: their productivity level is also drawn in the distribution \(G(\epsilon)\). In the following, we assume that \(h_i\) denoting the human capital at age \(i\) is a general human capital that is transferable (it can be used in all jobs and in home production): individuals accumulate this capital inside and outside firms. We assume that every age-group is associated with a particular level of human capital \(h_i\), with \(h_i < h_{i+1}\). The productivity of the job is then \(z \epsilon h_i\), and the instantaneous opportunity cost of employment \(b_i = bh_i\). Hence, this age-increasing component of the individual productivity allow older workers to accept lower job-specific productivity \(\epsilon\).^16

---

^14This assumption is a particular case of Nagypal & Mortensen (2007)’s framework, where the initial value of the idiosyncratic productivity is drawn from a distribution \(\tilde{G}(\epsilon)\) with \(G \neq \tilde{G}\). With our assumption, whether the worker is in the firm or in the pool of job seekers, their future opportunities are easily comparable, either through unemployment search \(\gamma e p(\theta_i)\) or through labor hoarding \((1 - s_e)\lambda_i\) (see Section 4.1.). Note that adopting this assumption in the MP model would give a comparative advantage to job seekers relative to workers within the firms, which is not realistic.

^15In the Mincerian wage equations, these two components explain the increase in wage earnings during the workers’ life cycle.

^16These simplifying assumptions are made for model tractability. Indeed, there is no depreciation in worker’s human capital during unemployment spells, as in Ljungqvist & Sargent (2008) or stagnation of this accumulation process during unemployment spells, as in Bagger et al. (2014). Nevertheless, given the short-time duration of an unemployment spell in the US, this seems to be a reasonable approximation.
Matching with directed search. We consider an economy in which labor market frictions imply a costly delay in the process of filling vacancies. Age is perfectly observed and a worker who applies to a job not matching the age-characteristic will have a nil production, and thus a nil surplus. Firms choose how many and what type of vacancies to open. The type of vacancy is simply defined by a worker’s age. Since search is directed, the probability that a worker meets a firm depends on her age. Since firms can \textit{ex-ante} age-direct their search, there is one matching function by age. Let $v_i(z)$ be the number of vacancies, $u_i(z)$ the number of unemployed workers, and $e_i(z)$ the endogenous search effort for a worker of age $i$. The matching function gives the number of contacts, $M(v_i(z), e_i(z) u_i(z))$, where $M$ is increasing and concave in both arguments and with constant returns-to-scale. From the firm’s perspective, the contact probability is $q(\theta_i(z)) \equiv M(v_i(z), e_i(z) u_i(z)) v_i(z) = M(1, \theta_i^{-1}(z))$ with $\theta_i(z) = \frac{u_i(z)}{e_i(z) u_i(z)}$ as the corresponding labor market tightness. The probability for unemployed workers of age $i$ to be employed is then defined by $e_i(z) p(\theta_i(z))[1 - G(R_i(z))]$ with $p(\theta_i(z)) \equiv \frac{M(v_i(z), e_i(z) u_i(z))}{e_i(z) u_i(z)} = M(\theta_i(z), 1)$ as the contact probability of the effective unemployed worker. Note that the hiring process is then age-differentiated via a firms’ age-specific search intensity ($v_i(z)$), an age-specific reservation productivity ($R_i(z)$), and an age-specific search effort from unemployed workers ($e_i(z)$).

3.2 Firms’ and workers’ intertemporal values

Firms’ problem. Any firm is free to open a job vacancy directed at an age-specific labor market and engage in hiring, $c$ denotes the flow cost of hiring a worker and $\beta \in [0,1]$ the discount factor. Let $V_i(z)$ be the expected value of a vacant position in the age-$i$ labor market, given the aggregate state of the economy $z$ at time $t$, and $J_i(z, \epsilon)$ the value of a job filled by a worker of age $i$ with productivity $\epsilon$ in aggregate state $z$. The firm’s search value is given by:

$$V_i(z) = -c + q(\theta_i(z)) \beta E_z \left[ \pi_i \int_0^1 J_i(z', x) dG(x) + (1 - \pi_i)V_i(z') \right] + (1 - q(\theta_i(z))) \beta E_z V_i(z')$$

where the operator $E_z$ denotes the expectation with respect to the aggregate productivity component $z$. Given that search is directed, if the worker ages between the meeting and the production processes (with a probability $1 - \pi_i$), the job is not filled. We will assume
hereafter the standard free-entry condition, i.e., $V_i(z) = 0$, $\forall i, z$, which leads to:

$$c q(\theta_i(z)) = \beta \pi_i E_z \int_0^1 J_i(z', x) dG(x)$$

Vacancies are determined according to the expected value of a contact with an age-$i$ unemployed worker, which depends on the uncertainty in the hiring process arising from the two components of productivity, $z$ and $\epsilon$.

Given a state vector $(z, \epsilon)$ and for a bargained wage $w_i(z, \epsilon)$, the expected value $J_i(z, \epsilon)$ of a filled job by a worker of age $i$, $\forall i \in \{Y, ..., O_{T-1}\}$, is defined by:

$$J_i(z, \epsilon) = \max \left\{ z \epsilon h_i - w_i(z, \epsilon) + \beta \pi_i (1 - s_e) \left( \lambda_i E_z \int_0^1 J_i(z', x) dG(x) \right) + (1 - \lambda_i) E_z J_i(z', \epsilon) \right\}$$

where $s_e$ is the exogenous separation rate. Notice that, for $i = O_T$, aging implies retirement. The value function becomes:

$$J_{O_T}(z, \epsilon) = \max \left\{ z \epsilon h_{O_T} - w_{O_T}(z, \epsilon) + \beta \pi_{O_T} (1 - s_e) \left( \lambda_{O_T} E_z \int_0^1 J_{O_T}(z', x) dG(x) \right) + (1 - \lambda_{O_T}) E_z J_{O_T}(z', \epsilon) \right\}$$

The short horizon reduces the value of a filled job for a given wage.

**Workers’ problem.** Values for employed (on a match of productivity $\epsilon$) and unemployed workers of any age $i \neq O_T$, are respectively given by:

$$W_i(z, \epsilon) = \max \left\{ w_i(z, \epsilon) + \beta \pi_i \left[ (1 - s_e) \left( \lambda_i E_z \int_0^1 W_i(z', x) dG(x) \right) + (1 - \lambda_i) E_z W_i(z', \epsilon) \right] + s_e E_z U_i(z') \right\}$$

$$+ \beta (1 - \pi_i) \left[ (1 - s_e) \left( \lambda_{i+1} E_z \int_0^1 W_{i+1}(z', x) dG(x) \right) + (1 - \lambda_{i+1}) E_z W_{i+1}(z', \epsilon) \right] + s_e E_z U_{i+1}(z')$$
\[ U_i(z) = \max_{e_i(z)} \left\{ bh_i - \phi(e_i(z)) + \beta \pi_i \left[ e_i(z)p(\theta_i(z))E_z \int_0^1 W_i(z', x) dG(x) \right] + (1 - e_i(z)p(\theta_i(z)))E_z U_i(z') \right\} \]

with \( bh_i \geq 0 \) denoting the instantaneous opportunity cost of employment indexed on human capital \( h_i \) and \( \phi(.) \). The convex function capturing the disutility of search effort is \( e_i \). For \( i = O_T \), these values are simply given by:

\[ W_{O_T}(z, \epsilon) = \max \left\{ w_{O_T}(z, \epsilon) + \beta \pi_{O_T} \left[ (1 - s_\epsilon)(1 - \lambda_{O_T})E_z \int_0^1 W_{O_T}(z', x) dG(x) \right] + s_\epsilon E_z U_{O_T}(z') \right\} \]

\[ U_{O_T}(z) = \max_{e_{O_T}(z)} \left\{ bh_{O_T} - \phi(e_{O_T}(z)) + \beta \pi_{O_T} \left[ e_{O_T}(z)p(\theta_{O_T}(z))E_z \int_0^1 W_{O_T}(z', x) dG(x) \right] + (1 - e_{O_T}(z)p(\theta_{O_T}(z)))E_z U_{O_T}(z') \right\} \]

The worker’s optimal search effort decision then satisfies the following condition:

\[ \phi'(e_i(z)) = \beta \pi_i p(\theta_i(z))E_z \left[ \int_0^1 W_i(z', x) dG(x) - U_i(z') \right] \]

The marginal cost of the search effort at age \( i \) is equal to its expected marginal return.

### 3.3 Job surplus, Nash sharing rule, and reservation productivity

The surplus \( S_i(z, \epsilon) \) generated by a job of productivity \( z \epsilon \) is the sum of the worker’s and the firm’s surplus \( S_i(z, \epsilon) = W_i(z, \epsilon) - U_i(z) + J_i(z, \epsilon) \) given that \( V_i(z) = 0 \) at equilibrium. Thus, using the definitions of \( J_i(z, \epsilon), W_i(z, \epsilon), \) and \( U_i(z) \), the surplus is given by:

\[ S_i(z, \epsilon) = \max \left\{ zch_i - bh_i + \phi(e_i(z)) + \beta \pi_i (1 - s_\epsilon) \left[ \lambda_i - \frac{\gamma \epsilon_i(z)p(\theta_i(z))}{1 - s_\epsilon} \right] E_z \int_0^1 S_i(z', x) dG(x) \right\} + (1 - \lambda_i)E_z S_i(z', \epsilon) \]

\[ + \beta (1 - \pi_i)(1 - s_\epsilon) \left[ \lambda_{i+1} - \frac{\gamma \epsilon_{i+1}(z)p(\theta_{i+1}(z))}{1 - s_\epsilon} \right] E_z \int_0^1 S_{i+1}(z', x) dG(x) \right\} ; 0 \]
The reservation productivity $R_i(z)$ can then be defined by the condition $S_i(z, R_i(z)) = 0$. As in MP, a crucial implication of this rule is that job destruction is mutually optimal for the firm and the worker. $S_i(z, R_i(z)) = 0$ indeed entails $J_i(z, R_i(z)) = 0$ and $W_i(z, R_i(z)) = U_i(z)$. Note that the lower bound of any integral over $S_i(z, \epsilon)$ is actually the reservation productivity because no productivity levels below this level yield a positive job surplus. Given $S_i(z, \epsilon)$, the Nash bargaining leads to $W_i(z, \epsilon) - U_i(z) = \gamma_i S_i(z, \epsilon)$ and $J_i(z, \epsilon) = (1 - \gamma_i) S_i(z, \epsilon)$, where the age-specific bargaining power $\gamma_i$ may be specific to age $i$.

Using this sharing and the definitions of the value functions, the wage rule is:

$$w_i(z, \epsilon) = \gamma_i \left( z e_i(z) \theta_i(z) + \frac{1 - \pi_i}{\pi_{i+1}} ce_{i+1}(z) \theta_{i+1}(z) \right) + (1 - \gamma_i) \left( bh_i - \phi(e_i(z)) \right)$$

Because workers age, the returns on search activity is an average between age $i$ and $i+1$.

### 3.4 Equilibrium

**Definition 1.** The labor market equilibrium with directed search in a finite-horizon environment is defined by labor market tightness, search effort and separation rule (reservation productivity), respectively, $\theta_i(z)$, $e_i(z)$, and $R_i(z)$:

$$\frac{c}{q(\theta_i(z))} = (1 - \gamma_i) \beta \pi_i E_z S_i(z')$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

$$\phi'(e_i(z)) = \gamma_i \beta \pi_i E_z S_i(z')$$ \hspace{1cm} (3)

$$zh_i R_i(z) = bh_i + \Sigma_i(z) - \Lambda_i(z) - \Gamma_i(z)$$ \hspace{1cm} (4)

given average and individual surpluses:

$$S_i(z', x) \equiv \int_{R_i(z')}^{1} S_i(z', x) dG(x)$$ \hspace{1cm} (5)

$$S_i(z, \epsilon) = \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
zh_i(\epsilon - R_i(z)) \\
+ \beta \pi_i (1 - \lambda_i) (1 - s_\epsilon) E_z [S_i(z', \epsilon) - S_i(z', R_i(z))] \\
+ \beta (1 - \pi_i) (1 - \lambda_i) (1 - s_\epsilon) E_z [S_{i+1}(z', \epsilon) - S_{i+1}(z', R_i(z))] \end{array} \right\}$$ \hspace{1cm} (6)

\[17\] See the calibration of the model in Section 4.1 for more details on this point.
where "search value", "labor hoarding value" and "continuation value" are respectively defined as follows:

\[
\Sigma_i(z) = -\phi(e_i(z)) + \beta \left[ \pi_i \gamma_i e_i(z) p(\theta_i(z)) E_z S_i(z') + (1 - \pi_i) \gamma_{i+1} e_{i+1}(z) p(\theta_{i+1}(z)) E_z S_{i+1}(z') \right] \quad (7)
\]

\[
\Lambda_i(z) = \beta (1 - s_e) \left[ \pi_i \lambda_i E_z S_i(z') + (1 - \pi_i) \lambda_{i+1} E_z S_{i+1}(z') \right] \quad (8)
\]

\[
\Gamma_i(z) = \beta (1 - s_e) \left[ \pi_i (1 - \lambda_i) E_z S_i(z', R_i(z)) + (1 - \pi_i) (1 - \lambda_{i+1}) E_z S_{i+1}(z', R_{i+1}(z)) \right] \quad (9)
\]

*The stock-flow dynamics on the labor market are given in Appendix E.4 by equations (23), (24), (25), and (26), whereas the dynamics of the aggregate shock is given by (1).*

As in Menzio & Shi (2010), directed search implies that the problem is block-recursive\textsuperscript{18}: after solving the dynamics of the forward variables, we deduce the dynamics of the backward variables ((un)-employment rates) as well as the dynamics of the job distribution.

### 3.5 Identification of model parameters using age heterogeneity

We derive the restrictions allowing the model to fit the first-order moments of the data by age (the levels, in section 3.5.1), and deduce the implications of these restrictions on the second-order moments by age (volatilities, in section 3.5.2).

#### 3.5.1 Steady state properties: why do levels of labor flows fall with age?

At the steady state,\textsuperscript{19} the model must generate an age-pattern of transition rates such that, for age group $i$:

\[
JSR_i \approx s_e + (1 - s_e) \lambda_i G(R_i) > JSR_{i+1} \quad (10)
\]

\[
JFR_i \approx e_i p(\theta_i)[1 - G(R_i)] > JFR_{i+1} \quad (11)
\]

These age pattern in the finding and separation rates is consistent with the evidence found in US data if $JFR_i > JFR_{i+1}$ and $JSR_i > JSR_{i+1}$ (see Figure 1, top panels).\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18}See proposition 3 in Appendix E.2.

\textsuperscript{19}For the sake of brevity, we consider $z = 1$ in the steady state analysis.

\textsuperscript{20}Cheron et al. (2013) analyze all the other cases: the age-increasing reservation productivity case and the U-shaped pattern of the reservation productivity. Given that US data are not in line with these two last cases, we restrict our analysis to the case where the steady state of the model matches the long run values of $JFR$ and $JSR$. 

17
Job separation rate falls with age. Equation (10) suggests that the job separation rate is driven by the reservation productivity by age \((R_i)\). Reservation productivity differs across age groups because workers differ in terms of expected time on the labor market. Intuitively, the economic mechanism is the following: with \(R_i > R_{i+1}\), older workers are less selective than younger workers when new opportunities are available. A shorter horizon leads old workers to accept lower and lower job opportunities because they know that the number of draws before retirement is falling. We refer to this effect as a "selection effect". This can be seen in the model equations. For workers close to retirement, only current surplus matters. Equation (4) shows that reservation productivity converges to the unemployed worker’s current surplus \(bh_i\) as the worker ages, i.e. when the expected gains on labor market, contingent to their future status \((\Sigma_i, \Lambda_i \text{ and } \Gamma_i)\) tend towards zero \(^{21}\). In contrast, prime-age workers have a long work-life expectancy: the expected gains are larger than zero. Equation (4) shows that, if the return on search is larger than the one on labor hoarding, i.e. if \(\Sigma_i > \Lambda_i\),\(^{22}\) then \(R_i > h_i b\). For prime-age workers, the larger value of their unemployment option pushes up their wages and thus the reservation productivity of their jobs. This leads to an age-decreasing pattern of job separation.\(^{23}\)

Both \(\Sigma_i\) and \(\Lambda_i\) depend on the age-specific average surplus \((\bar{S}_i)\), they are actually different as the value of search \(\Sigma_i\) can be manipulated by agents through their choices for \(\{e_i, \theta_i\}\), whereas labor hoarding \(\Lambda_i\) depends on an exogenous probability \(\lambda_i\): in our paper, the younger the worker, the lower \(\lambda_i\), the larger the incentive to invest in search on the labor market because a longer horizon allows them to recoup search costs, and thus the larger the gap between the search value and the value of labor hoarding.

The job finding rate falls with age. Equation (11) shows that the job finding rate depends on search efforts by unemployed workers \(e_i\) and firms \(\theta_i\), but also on the reservation productivity \(R_i\). We have just discussed the "selection effect": a shorter horizon leads old workers to accept lower and lower job opportunities because they know that the number of draws before retirement is falling. This effect tends to increase the job finding rate as the worker ages, which is counterfactual. In order for the model to be consistent with the age-decreasing pattern of the job finding rate, it must be the case that the age

\[^{21}\]The retirement age is a terminal condition and acts as if the discount factor \(\beta\) were tending towards 0 when worker gets closer to retirement.

\[^{22}\]We show in proposition 4 in Appendix E.3 that this restriction is equivalent in our case to \(\gamma_i e_i p(\theta_i) > (1 - s_e) \lambda_i\)

\[^{23}\]The separation rate also depends on the exogenous probability \(\lambda_i\). Hereafter, we restrict our analysis to a sufficiently flat age profile for this exogenous variable to ensure that our results are not exogenously determined by the calibration of \(\lambda\) at the end of the working life. Were the growth of this probability highly tilted over the life cycle, the age-pattern of \(R\) could have been dominant in shaping the separation rate. We exclude this case \(a \ priori\), and we check that our calibration is consistent with this restriction.
profile of \(\{e_i, \theta_i\}\) is prevalent and leads to a fall of job finding rate by age. The age decline of \(\{e_i, \theta_i\}\) must be induced by the age decline of the average surplus per age (\(S_i\)).\(^{24}\) Hence, the crucial point for the age profile of \(\{e_i, \theta_i\}\) is to generate an age-decreasing pattern in \(S_i\). This is the case for the "horizon effect" because a shorter horizon prior to retirement causes the match-specific surplus to decline with the worker’s age: the gains from the job are capitalized on a duration that falls when worker ages. The falling average expected surplus by age (\(S_i > S_{i+1}\)) implies that the "horizon effect" dominates the "selection effect," leading search efforts \((e_i \text{ and } \theta_i)\) to be age-decreasing. Note that the horizon effect can be offset by a large increase in human capital at the end of the life cycle. Its growth rate, \(\delta_i = (h_{i+1} - h_i)/h_i\), is calibrated to replicate the observed wage age-profile.\(^{25}\)

3.5.2 Cyclical properties: why do volatilities of labor flows increase with age?

Are the conditions that imply an age-decreasing pattern for the levels of the transition rates compatible with the fact that older workers’ flows are more responsive to the business cycle than for their younger counterparts? It can be shown that the restrictions for which the model can reproduce the age-profile of worker transitions by age group at the steady state ensure that the age-pattern of their volatility is also matched.\(^{26}\)

Why a more volatile JFR for older workers? In the MP model, in order to understand the response of labor market tightness with respect to aggregate productivity, one needs to look at fluctuations in the value of a filled vacancy (as the free entry condition provides a direct link between labor market tightness \(\theta\) and job value \(J\)). Log-linear

---

\(^{24}\)Equation (2) gives the link between search effort of the firms \(\theta_i\) and \(E_z S_i(z')\), whereas the combination of equations (2) and (3) shows that the search effort of unemployed workers can be expressed as a function of only \(\theta_i\), and thus depends only on \(E_z S_i(z')\).

\(^{25}\)In proposition 5 of Appendix E.3, we derive the conditions under which the horizon effect dominates the selection effect and show analytically that the horizon effect dominates the selection effect if \(\delta_i\) is below a threshold value. Our quantitative results show that, with the calibrated \(\delta_i\), using US data, this condition holds.

\(^{26}\)In Appendix E.5, we analytically derive the business cycle elasticity by age and show that older worker’s responsiveness to the aggregate shock is larger than their younger counterparts’ if the restrictions at the steady state (Propositions 4 and 5) are satisfied.

\(^{27}\)J refers to the relevant hiring incentive upon entry (the firm still does not know the match-productivity draw). \(J\) is the expected value of a filled vacancy, with expectations with respect to micro-economic match-productivity draw.
approximation of the job creation condition leads to

\[ \hat{J}_i = \frac{zh_i X(R_i)}{zh_i X(R_i) - (bh_i + \Sigma_i)(1 - G(R_i))} - \frac{\Sigma_i(1 - G(R_i))}{zh_i X(R_i) - (bh_i + \Sigma_i)(1 - G(R_i))}\hat{\Sigma}_i \]

\[ \hat{J}_O = \frac{zh_O X(R_O)}{zh_O X(R_O) - bh_O(1 - G(R_O))}\hat{\Sigma}_i \] (12)

\[ \hat{\Sigma}_i \rightarrow 0 \]

where hat variables denote log-deviation from the steady state, \( J_i = \int_{R_i}^1 J_i(x)dG(x) \) and \( X(R_i) = \int_{R_i}^1 xdG(x) \) are respectively the average job values for age-\( i \) worker and their average productivity. Equation (12) illustrates previous results found in the literature. Shimer (2005) finds a large wage elasticity to the aggregate shock \( z \). Following a positive productivity shock (\( \hat{z} > 0 \)), the increase in wages leaves profits nearly unchanged. As a result, firms’ hiring incentives, captured by \( \hat{J} \), does not respond much to the business cycle. This can be seen in equation (12), the pro-cyclical wage response is due to improved labor market opportunities for unemployed workers (\( \hat{\Sigma}_i > 0 \)), which tends to dampen the response of firms’ hiring incentives (\( \hat{J} > 0 \) but lower). Hagendorn & Manovskii (2008) match the volatility of market tightness after focusing on the size of the percentage changes of profits in response to changes in productivity. They argue that these percentage changes are large if the size of profits is small and the increase in productivity is not fully absorbed by an increase in wages. This leads them to consider a large firm’s bargaining power (small \( \gamma \)) and high unemployment benefit \( b \). Indeed, in equation (12), a high unemployment benefit \( b \) tends to increase the response of firms’ hiring incentives to the aggregate shock (the coefficient in front of \( \hat{z} \) goes up). In addition, with Nash bargaining, search opportunities on the labor market expand in booms, which drives wages upward. Under Hagendorn & Manovskii (2008)’s calibration, with workers’ low bargaining power, \( \hat{\Sigma}_i \) disappears from equation (12) \(^\text{28} \), thereby making hirings more responsive to the business cycle.

In our paper, we consider business cycle response by age, without using Hagendorn & Manovskii (2008)’s calibration. Old workers’ search value \( \Sigma \) converges to zero ("horizon effect" implies \( \Sigma_i \rightarrow 0 \)). This leads the fluctuations of job value to depend only on productivity shock (equation (13)). In contrast, for young and prime-age workers, the search value is positive in economic boom and thus the impact of the productivity shock is dampened by the pro-cyclical response of the search value to the business cycle shocks. With Nash bargaining, wages react not only to productivity changes, but also to fluctuations of outside opportunities. The higher the wage adjustment, the lower the

\(^{28}\) In Appendix E.5., equation (27) shows that \( \Sigma_i = 0 \) when worker’s bargaining power \( \gamma_i \) tends to zero in our model.
volatility in labor market. As generations of workers differ according to their sensitivity to future opportunities, they differ in terms of wage adjustments. Specifically, this implies that older workers have less pro-cyclical individual wages\textsuperscript{29}, and thus higher volatility in labor market tightness, which in turn also makes the search effort more responsive to the business cycle. In contrast, as younger workers are more responsive to outside options, their wages are more pro-cyclical. This dampens the firm’s incentives to post vacancies directed to these younger workers. The age-varying influence of the outside options in the Nash wage bargaining is then key to explain the age-pattern of the transition rates’ volatility.

**Why a more volatile JSR for older workers?** Log-linear approximation of the job destruction condition leads to

\[
\hat{R}_i = -\frac{bh_i + \Sigma_i}{bh_i + \Sigma_i + \Gamma_i} \frac{\hat{\Sigma}_i}{\hat{\Sigma}_i} - \frac{\Lambda_i}{bh_i + \Sigma_i + \Gamma_i} \hat{\Lambda}_i \rightarrow \hat{R}_O = -\hat{\Sigma} \quad (14)
\]

Equation (14) summarizes the business cycle response of job destruction. As in Mortensen & Pissarides (1994), following an increase in aggregate productivity (\(\hat{\Sigma} > 0\)), reservation productivity falls (\(\hat{R}_i < 0\)): firms want to keep more workers. \(\hat{\Sigma}_i\) captures changes in opportunity cost of employment for the worker. In booms, increases in the expected gains from search on the labor market (\(\hat{\Sigma}_i > 0\)) makes workers’ less willing to remain within the firm. This tends to raise the reservation productivity in booms (\(\hat{R}_i > 0\)). The third term in equation (14) relates to changes in labor hoarding. \(\hat{\Lambda}_i\) measures the extent to which the employer is willing to incur a loss now in anticipation of a future improvement in the value of the match’s product. It is the option value of retaining an existing match. In boom, firms keep more workers, rather than waiting for new workers to arrive from the matching market. The value of labor hoarding increases in booms (\(\hat{\Lambda}_i > 0\)). Given that the steady state restrictions allowing to match the age pattern of transition rates are such that the search value dominates the labor hoarding value (\(\Sigma_i > \Lambda_i\)), we also have \(\hat{\Sigma}_i > \hat{\Lambda}_i\). Therefore, the impact of an aggregate shock on the reservation productivity is dampened by pro-cyclical changes in the search value for young and prime age workers. In contrast, for older workers, with a shorter horizon on the labor market, the "search value" and labor hoarding are close to zero: this leads to the high response of reservation

\textsuperscript{29}This low elasticity of individual wages when workers age is not easy to measure in the data. Indeed, data provides information about aggregate wages for each age group. However, theory predicts that, (i) within each age class, there is substantial productivity heterogeneity and (ii) productivity distribution changes along the business cycle. Hence, the dynamics of aggregate wage per age do not provide sufficient information about the dynamics of individual wages. See Section Section 4.3 and Appendix B.
productivity to current aggregate shocks.

4 Quantitative Analysis

In this section, we apply the model to the data. The model is calibrated to match the first-order moments found in the data (section 4.1). Under this calibration, we assess the model’s ability to generate second-order moments consistent with aggregate data and stylized facts by age. This quantitative analysis aims to demonstrate that (i) the parameter restrictions imposed to match the first-order moments are sufficient to generate the age-increasing volatilities observed in the data (Section 4.2) and (ii) the interactions between the search effort and the endogenous separations is key for the replication of the volatility differences across ages (Section 4.2.4). In Section 4.3, we assess the model’s fit with respect to wage fluctuations by age.

4.1 Calibration

The vector of the model parameter is $\Phi = \{\Phi_1, \Phi_2\}$ with $\text{dim}(\Phi) = 48$. The functional forms of the matching and the search cost function are respectively

$$M(v_i, e_i u_i) = Hv_i^{1-\eta}(e_i u_i)$$
$$\phi(e_i) = \frac{e_i^{1+\phi}}{1+\phi}$$

All parameters calibrated using external information are:

$$\Phi_1 = \{\beta, \{\pi_i\}_{i=Y}, \{s_{e,i}\}_{i=Y}, c, \{\gamma_{e,i}\}_{i=Y}, \eta, \phi, b, \rho, \sigma, \nu\}, \text{dim}(\Phi_1) = 22$$

The discount factor $\beta$ is calibrated to match a weekly discount factor consistent with an annual interest rate of 4%. We set $\pi_i$ such that an age class corresponds to the same age groups as in the data: $i = Y, A$ are 16 – 24 and 25 – 54 year-old workers, and $i = O_j$ for $j = 1, \ldots, 7$ ($T = 7$) are the 55, ..., 61 year-old workers. The parameters for the aggregate productivity process $\rho$ and $\sigma$ are set to the values proposed by Shimer (2005). For exogenous job separation rates by age, $s_{e,i}$, for $i = Y, A, O$, we follow Fujita & Ramey (2012): at each age, the exogenous job separations represent 34 percent of total separations. The calibration of the cost of vacancy posting $c$ is based on Barron et al. (1997) and Barron & Bishop (1985) who suggest an amount equal to 17 percent of a
40-hour workweek (nine applicants for each vacancy filled, with two hours of work time required to process each application). The elasticity parameter of the matching function $\eta$ is arbitrary fixed at its traditional value of 0.5 (Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)), because there is no information about the matching function by age. Moreover, the endogeneity of search effort implies that the elasticity of the matching function also depends on the elasticity of the cost function for search effort (Gomme & Lkhagvasuren (2015)). Finally, we set $\phi = 0.45$, which is an intermediate value of estimates of Lise (2013) and Christensen et al. (2005).

For the other parameters, we need some restrictions in order to identify these parameters using our first-order moments on labor market flows. Thus, we assume that (i) older workers share the same level of human capital, leading to $\{h_i\}_{i=Y}^{O} = \{1, h_A, h_O\}$, (ii) older workers share the same $\lambda_i$, leading to $\{\lambda_i\}_{i=Y}^{O} = \lambda_O$. We are left with 3 parameters: $\{\lambda_Y, \lambda_A, \lambda_O\}$, and (iii) younger workers have a specific bargaining power $\gamma_Y \neq \gamma$, where $\gamma = \gamma_A = \gamma_O$. The bargaining power of age-$i$ workers for $i = A, O$ are such that $\gamma_i = \eta$. This last restriction is also used by Shimer (2005). Hence, 10 parameters are estimated:

$$\Phi_2 = \{H, \chi, h_A, h_O, b, \gamma_Y, \lambda_Y, \lambda_A, \lambda_O, \sigma\} \quad \text{dim}(\Phi_2) = 10$$

The calibrated parameters are the solution to $\min_{\Phi_2} ||\Psi^{\text{theo}}(\Phi_2) - \Psi||$, where the numerical solution for $\Psi^{\text{theo}}(\cdot)$ is provided by the algorithm described in Appendix F. The 10 free parameters are the elements of $\Phi_2$, whereas the 10 first-order moments provided by the data are:

$$\Psi = \{\hat{b}, \bar{w}, JFR_Y, JFR_A, JFR_O, JSR_Y, JSR_A, JSR_O, w_A/w_Y, w_O/w_Y\}$$

with $\text{dim}(\Psi) = 10$. We denote $X = \frac{\sum_{i=O} m_i n_i X_i}{\sum_{i=O} m_i n_i}$ for $X = JSR, w$ and $JFR = \frac{\sum_{i=O} m_i n_i JFR_i}{\sum_{i=O} m_i n_i}$. We choose as an additional target the value of the opportunity cost of employment measured by Hall & Milgrom (2008), which is $\hat{b} = 0.7$.\footnote{This value is also used by Menzio et al. (2016).} Note that, in our model with endogenous search effort, this instantaneous value of leisure is actually $b_i - \phi_i(e_i(z))$, not $b_i$ where $b_i = bh_i$ for age group $i$.

We report the empirical targets in Table 4, as well as the model fit: the estimation results show that the steady state of the model is very close to empirical targets.

Table 5 summarizes the calibration. Our calibration strategy matches the observed labor flow rates per age at the steady state (Table 4). This imposes particular restrictions on
Table 4: First order moments: Ψ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\text{JFR}_Y$</th>
<th>$\text{JFR}_A$</th>
<th>$\text{JFR}_O$</th>
<th>$\text{JSR}_Y$</th>
<th>$\text{JSR}_A$</th>
<th>$\text{JSR}_O$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model fit</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$\pi$</th>
<th>$w_A/w_Y$</th>
<th>$w_O/w_Y$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model fit</td>
<td>0.6786</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overbar refers to aggregate average. Data source in Appendix B.

Table 5: Benchmark calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External information $\Phi_1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r = 4%$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calibration $\Phi_2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| $\lambda_Y$ | $\lambda_A$ | $\lambda_O$ | $h_A$ | $h_O$ | $\gamma_Y$ |
| HLS | 0.0175 | 0.045 | 0.055 | 1.58 | 1.57 | 0.4 |
| FR | - | 0.085 | - | - | - | - |

HLS = Our weekly calibration
FR = Fujita and Ramey’s (2011) weekly calibration

the model. Indeed, matching the gaps between flow rates across ages at the steady state (i.e., the elasticities to some profitability differentials) is likely to discipline parameter calibration. Especially that related to the age-pattern of search effort, and then the elasticity of search cost function, which is key in the ability of the model to match these gaps.

We must stress three other points about the calibrated parameters. First, younger workers are less likely to benefit from changes in productivity during their years of work experience. A smaller $\lambda$ for young workers indicates a lower ability to move up within the firm and improve match-specific productivity on the job. If low match-specific productivity is interpreted as a mismatch, this phenomenon will be more persistent in the youth labor market. Hence, relative to older or prime-age workers, the unemployment option seems to be better, if they want to draw a new match-specific shock to reduce mismatch. We deduce that our smallest values for $\lambda_i$ for $i = Y$ reflects that the mismatch is dominant at this stage of the life cycle, whereas for prime-age and older workers, the higher value of $\lambda$ may reflect their ability to adapt to new tasks within the firm as they have accumulated higher levels of specific human capital.

Secondly, to account for the differences between young and prime-age workers with respect...
to the job finding rate $JFR$, at the steady state, bargaining power must be youth-specific: a value equal to 0.4 for the younger workers is then able to match the relatively high value of their job finding rate. This lower value is consistent with statistics provided by the BLS\textsuperscript{31}, which provides some indirect evidence for a significant age-specific bargaining power. Indeed, for the men aged for 16 to 24 years old, the percentage of workers with a union affiliation is equal to 4.9\%, whereas for those aged 25 to 64 years, it is 13\%.

### Table 6: Implied values of the outside option

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$\frac{bh_i - \phi(\epsilon_i)}{h_i}$</th>
<th>$\frac{bh_Y - \phi(\epsilon_Y)}{h_Y}$</th>
<th>$\frac{bh_A - \phi(\epsilon_A)}{h_A}$</th>
<th>$\sum_{i=1}^{7} m_i \frac{bh_O - \phi(\epsilon_i)}{h_O}$</th>
<th>$\frac{bh_O - \phi(\epsilon_i)}{h_O}$ for $i = 1, ..., 7$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.6786</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>0.668</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td>0.891</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third comment deals with the value of $b$. The results reported in Table 5 show that our calibrated value for $b$ is lower than that used by Fujita & Ramey (2012) in their calibration à la Hagendorn & Manovskii (2008). The net value of home production, shown in Table 6, is closer to Hall & Milgrom (2008)’s estimated value for outside opportunities. Nevertheless, these calibration results lead to higher values for the outside option than that used by Shimer (2005). This can help the model generate large responses to productivity shocks.

### 4.2 Worker flows and unemployment fluctuations

Table 7 reports labor market volatility across age groups. Comparing row 1 (Model) to row 5 (Data), the model can generate the observed age pattern in the volatility of labor flows and unemployment. This suggests that, given the parameter restrictions found at the steady state to match age-patterns of transition rates by age (section 3.5.1) hold, such that the age-pattern of volatility is matched by the model.

#### 4.2.1 Higher volatility for older workers on the labor market: the horizon effect.

The model slightly overestimates the volatility gaps across age of the job finding rate (old workers’ JFR is $0.19/0.13 = 1.46$ times higher than prime age workers’, versus $0.22/0.17 = 1.29$ in the data; for young workers, the volatility gap is $0.06/0.13 = 0.46$ versus $0.16/0.17 = 0.9$ in the data), and matches those of the job separation rates.

\textsuperscript{31}See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t01.htm
Table 7: Model Predictions by Age Group $i$: 2nd Order Moments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$X_i$</th>
<th>$i = Y$ (16-24)</th>
<th>$i = A$ (25-54)</th>
<th>$i = O$ (55-61)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$U_Y$</td>
<td>$JFR_Y$</td>
<td>$JSR_Y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma(X_i)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Model</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No Hete.</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No HC</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Low $\gamma_Y$</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Data$^a$</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr($X_i, U_i$)</td>
<td>6. Model</td>
<td>1 -0.81</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. No Hete.</td>
<td>1 -0.89</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. No HC</td>
<td>1 -0.83</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Low $\gamma_Y$</td>
<td>1 -0.90</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Data$^a$</td>
<td>1 -0.91</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$: CPS quarterly averages of monthly data, Men, 1976Q1 - 2013Q1, HP filtering of logged data with $\lambda_{HP} = 10^5$.

*Model*: benchmark model, heterogeneous $h$ and $\lambda$, low $\gamma_Y$.

*No HC*: benchmark model with homogeneous $h$ and $\lambda$.

*No Hete*: model with homogeneous $h$ and $\lambda$ and $\gamma_Y$.

*Low $\gamma_Y$*: idem "No Hete" except $\gamma_Y = 0$ and $\gamma_i = 6$ for $i \geq A$.

(old workers’ JSR is $0.15/0.11 = 1.36$ times higher than prime age workers’, versus $0.2/0.14 = 1.42$ in the data; for young workers, the volatility gap is $0.07/0.11 = 0.63$ versus $0.08/0.14 = 0.57$ in the data). The volatility levels of job finding, separation and unemployment rates of the labor market of the prime-age worker are well reproduced, compared to Shimer (2005). 32

In order to understand these results, we explore the quantitative predictions of several versions of the model.

The effect of the short distance to retirement. We consider the life-cycle model, in which we remove any exogenous age-heterogeneity in the calibrated parameters ($h_i = h$, $\gamma_i = \gamma$, and $\lambda_i = \lambda$, $\forall i$). When all exogenous sources of heterogeneity by age are removed, heterogeneity across age groups only comes from the horizon effect: workers are heterogeneous only with respect to their working-life expectancy, prior to retirement. Table 7 (row 2, "No Hete") reports simulation results. Without heterogeneity, young workers obviously display the same business cycle fluctuations as prime-age workers’.

In order to have a sense of the impact of the short distance to retirement, let us have a look at old versus prime age workers. Older vs. prime-age workers display an age-increasing pattern in volatilities (old workers’ JFR is $0.17/0.12 = 1.4$ times larger than prime age workers’ versus $0.19/0.13 = 1.46$ in the benchmark model; the volatility increase for JSR is $0.13/0.11 = 1.18$ versus $0.15/0.11 = 1.36$ in the benchmark model), when considering no other heterogeneity than that created by the varying distance to retirement. This shows that the horizon...
effect is key to generating the higher cyclicality of older workers’ labor market flows.

*The impact of human capital.* Human capital was introduced to match the life-cycle wage profile, at the steady state. We simulate the model after removing only the increase in human capital as the worker ages. The simulation results are displayed in row 3 of Table 7. Comparing rows 1 and 3, older workers’ volatilities slightly rise. Indeed, human capital makes older workers more profitable, which increases older workers’ surplus while the horizon effect lowers older workers’ surplus. By removing human capital, the model is left with only the horizon effect, which lowers older workers’ surplus and makes them more responsive to aggregate shocks. However, comparing rows 1 and 3 for older workers, the volatility increase is small. This suggests that the life-cycle profile of human capital that is necessary to reproduce the observed life-cycle wage is not large enough to dampen the horizon effect in a sizable way. \(^{33}\)

*The impact of \(\lambda\), the age-specific probability of match-productivity draw.* The impact of the age-specific \(\lambda\) can be assessed by comparing the results of the model for old workers with "No Hete" (row 2, where \(\lambda_O = \lambda_A\)) with those of the model with "No HC" (row 3, where \(\lambda_O \neq \lambda_A\)). The main impact of a reduction in \(\lambda\) is to reduce all volatilities. When \(\lambda\) are age-specific, older worker have the highest \(\lambda\), leading all their job rates to be more sensitive to the fluctuations of reservation productivity. As changes in reservation productivity affects job separation but also job finding (by defining the range of acceptable jobs), this exogenous heterogeneity in \(\lambda\) matters for the goodness of the fit. Notice that quantitative results underline that the horizon effect is the main force at work for generating the large volatility gaps across ages because a large fraction of the volatility gaps across age is driven by the distance to retirement only, not by exogenous heterogeneity.

4.2.2 Low volatilities for younger workers on the labor market: a market for outsiders.

As both young and prime-age workers are far away from retirement, specificities on the youth labor market cannot be explained by the distance to retirement. We stress that adding a lower bargaining power for younger workers is necessary to replicate their lower volatility on the labor market. At the steady state, a low bargaining power for young workers is essential to match their high level of job finding rate. In Table 7, we consider the "Low \(\gamma_Y\)" case, where the only exogenous heterogeneity comes from a lower bargaining power for young workers. Notice that, in the "Low \(\gamma_Y\)" case (row 4), fluctuations in

\(^{33}\)Theoretical restrictions in proposition 5 of Appendix E.3 turn out to hold.
the youth labor market are less volatile than in the case where all workers have the same bargaining power (row 2 "No Hete"). Indeed, with low bargaining power, two opposing forces are at work: on the one hand, as in Hagendorn & Manovskii (2008), a lower workers’ bargaining power tend to increase volatility; on the other hand, with low workers’ bargaining power, the steady value of youth labor market tightness increases: young workers get a lower share of the surplus, which makes firms more willing to hire them. In a market with high tensions on the labor market, the wage is more responsive to changes in job opportunities. This last effect dominates. In a boom, young workers’ wage respond more to aggregate shocks than their older counterparts’, which tends to dampen the volatility of hiring incentives, hence JFR. In addition, as young workers are responsive to changes in search value, they are less willing to stay within the firm, which tends to dampen the fall in the reservation productivity in economic booms. Hence, youth fluctuations in JSR are less volatile than their older counterparts’.

Calibrating the model to replicate the labor market age-pattern at the steady state delivers a rather good match for business cycle features.

4.2.3 Aggregate variables.

This good fit of the age heterogeneity is convincing if the model can also match the dynamics of US aggregate labor market variables. Table 8 reports the second-order moment of aggregate labor market variables. Notice that (i) the model can predict the magnitude of aggregate labor market volatilities. Concerning vacancies, their volatility is slightly underestimated, and (ii) their correlation with unemployment (the Beveridge curve) is also well reproduced. Hence, in spite of endogenous separation, our model captures the dynamics around the aggregate Beveridge curve via a pro-cyclical search effort. Indeed, search effort increases the elasticity of the vacancies-unemployment ratio with respect to productivity.

Table 8: Model Predictions on Aggregate variables: 2nd Order Moments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>u</th>
<th>v</th>
<th>JFR</th>
<th>JSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev. Model</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr. with u Model</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* u: aggregate unemployment, v: vacancies, JFR: Job Finding Rate, JSR: Job Separation Rate
* Std. Dev.: Standard Deviation, Corr. with u: Correlation with u
* a: CPS quarterly averages of monthly data, Men, 1976Q1 - 2013Q1, HP-filtered logged data, with $\lambda_{HP} = 10^5$.
* b: Barnichon (2010)'s logged data.

34 The Barnichon’s (2010) data are updated (see https://sites.google.com/site/regisbarnichon/data) and rescaled as in Adjemian et al. (2017).
at all ages.\textsuperscript{35} There are two channels leading to higher vacancies-unemployment elasticity when search effort is endogenous: (i) the elasticity of vacancies-unemployment ratio with respect to "net profits" is always larger when search effort is endogenous, because search effort is complement to investment in vacancies, (ii) the elasticity of "net profits" with respect to the productivity is always larger when search effort is endogenous because the share of productivity in profits is larger than in an economy where search effort is constant. Finally, while the correlation between unemployment and vacancies is ambiguous without endogenous search effort, it becomes negative for sufficiently high values for the elasticity of search effort. Indeed, in the case without search effort, counter-cyclical separations can amplify the counter-cyclical responses of the unemployment rate to productivity shocks, and the small response of the vacancy-unemployment ratio can lead to a counter-cyclical response in the vacancy rate. In contrast, with endogenous search effort, a sufficiently high elasticity of search effort ensures that the vacancy rate is pro-cyclical, leading to a negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment.\textsuperscript{36} Pro-cyclical response of the search effort eliminates incentives for firms to use recessions to change the composition of their workforce, and preserves the Beveridge curve.

\textbf{4.2.4 The contributions of search effort and endogenous separations}

In this section, we provide an evaluation of the interactions between search effort and endogenous separations in our life cycle model of equilibrium unemployment. We want to show that the interaction between the endogenous search effort and endogenous separations not only magnifies the volatilities of aggregate variables,\textsuperscript{37} but it also contributes to magnify the differences across age, and thus allowing the model to be close to the data.\textsuperscript{38}

We thus propose two simulations. First, we freeze the response of workers’ search effort

\textsuperscript{35}This result is consistent with findings in Gomme & Lkhagvasuren (2015) in a model with infinitely-lived agents and exogenous separation and in the case of a wage posting equilibrium. See proposition 1 and corollary 1 in Appendix D for analytical results in the case of the MP model.

\textsuperscript{36}See proposition 2 in Appendix D for analytical results.

\textsuperscript{37}In Appendix D, proposition 1 shows that the elasticity of labor market tightness is magnified by endogenous search effort, leading $JFR$ ($JSR$) to be more (less) volatile (see corollary 1). We also prove that endogenous search effort allows the MP model with endogenous separation to generate a negative correlation between $u$ and $v$ (see proposition 1 in Appendix D), Obviously $\hat{\epsilon}_{\text{variable}} > \hat{\epsilon}_{\text{constant}}$ (see the proof of proposition 6 in Appendix E.5), the interaction between endogenous search effort and separations magnifies the volatilities of transition rates. Moreover, the age-increasing pattern of the volatilities is magnified by the endogenous search effort: $\hat{JFR}_{i+1} - \hat{JFR}_i$ declines when $\phi \to \infty$ (see the proof of proposition 6 in Appendix E.5) as well $\hat{JSR}_{i+1} - \hat{JSR}_i$ as $\hat{R}_{\text{variable}} < \hat{R}_{\text{constant}}$.

\textsuperscript{38}The Log-linear approximations of the transition are $\hat{JFR}_i = \hat{\epsilon}_i + (1 - \eta) \hat{\theta}_i - G(R_i) \varepsilon_{G(R_i)} \hat{R}_i$ and $\hat{JSR}_i = \frac{1}{\epsilon_1 + (1 - \kappa) \lambda G(R_i)} \varepsilon_{G(R_i)} \hat{R}_i$. Given that $\hat{\theta}_{\text{variable}} > \hat{\theta}_{\text{constant}}$ (proposition 1 in Appendix D), obviously $\hat{\epsilon}_{\text{variable}} > \hat{\epsilon}_{\text{constant}}$ = 0, and $\hat{R}_{\text{variable}} < \hat{R}_{\text{constant}}$ (see the proof of proposition 6 in Appendix E.5), the interaction between endogenous search effort and separations magnifies the volatilities of transition rates. Moreover, the age-increasing pattern of the volatilities is magnified by the endogenous search effort: $\hat{JFR}_{i+1} - \hat{JFR}_i$ declines when $\phi \to \infty$ (see the proof of proposition 6 in Appendix E.5) as well $\hat{JSR}_{i+1} - \hat{JSR}_i$ as $\hat{R}_{\text{variable}} < \hat{R}_{\text{constant}}$.\textsuperscript{29}
to the business cycle by imposing a low elasticity for search effort ("$\varepsilon_{e|z} \text{ low}$"). Secondly, we restrict separations to be exogenous ("Exo. Sep.").

Table 9: Model Predictions by Age Group $i$: 2nd Order Moments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$X_i$</th>
<th>$i = Y (16-24)$</th>
<th>$i = A (25-54)$</th>
<th>$i = O (55-61)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma(X_i)$ Bench</td>
<td>0.11 0.06 0.07</td>
<td>0.20 0.13 0.11</td>
<td>0.29 0.19 0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_{e</td>
<td>z}$ low</td>
<td>0.088 0.022 0.083</td>
<td>0.101 0.033 0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exo. Sep.</td>
<td>0.157 0.144 0</td>
<td>0.163 0.151 0</td>
<td>0.18 0.16 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Corr($X_i, U_i$) Bench  | 1 -0.81 0.88 | 1 -0.88 0.86 | 1 -0.93 0.89 |
| $\varepsilon_{e|z}$ low | 1 -0.54 0.97 | 1 -0.60 0.95 | 1 -0.77 0.97 |
| Exo. Sep.               | 1 -0.99 0 | 1 -0.99 0 | 1 -0.99 0 |

*Bench*: benchmark calibration

* $\varepsilon_{e|z} \text{ low}$*: $\phi = 2$ and $b = 0.8$ to match $u = 4.86$. Exogenous search effort, endogenous separations.

*Exo. Sep.": $\lambda_i = \sigma_e = 0$ and $s_{e,i} = JSR_i$, with $b = 0.8$ to match $u = 4.86$. Endogenous search effort. Exogenous separations.

We change the opportunity cost of employment in order to maintain the same level of aggregate unemployment in each model.

In Table 9, the model with a constant search effort can generate age-increasing volatilities. This suggests that the horizon effect still prevails when distance to retirement affects volatility across age-groups only through firms’ search effort $\theta_i$. However, the magnitude of volatility gaps across age groups can be matched only with endogenous search effort. With constant search effort, the volatility gaps are reduced by 20pp on average, thereby moving away from the stylized facts. Hence, the search effort channel is key to understand the observed age heterogeneity over the business cycle.

Exogenous separations also lead to small increases in volatility as the worker ages. Hence, it is not only the endogenous search effort that allows the model to generate significant volatility gaps across age groups, but also the endogenous job separation rates. This is consistent with CPS data: the contribution of fluctuations in the job separation rate to age-specific unemployment fluctuations is sizable and increases as the worker ages (see Table 3, rows 1-3). Hence, by omitting this age specificity in the job separation rates, the model with exogenous separation rates also move the theory away from the data.

Hence, these two experiences underline the key role of the interaction between endogenous search effort and endogenous separations in order to account for the volatility gaps across ages.

The results for aggregate variables are reported in Table 10. The magnitudes of volatilities can only be matched by the “complete” model. In the model with exogenous separation rates ($\lambda_i = \sigma_e = 0$ & $s_{e,i} = JSR_i$), search effort is variable: as in Gomme & Lkhagvasuren (2015), our result on aggregate data suggest that search effort can be a sufficient mechanism for solving the volatility puzzle.\(^{39}\) Hence, this simplified model can be considered as

\(^{39}\)These quantitative results clearly support analytical results in Appendix D.
Table 10: Model Predictions on Aggregate variables: 2nd Order Moments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>u</th>
<th>v</th>
<th>JFR</th>
<th>JSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev. Bench</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varepsilon_{e</td>
<td>z} ) low</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exo. Sep.</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr. with u Bench</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varepsilon_{e</td>
<td>z} ) low</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exo. Sep.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-0.99</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Bench*: benchmark calibration. \( u \) aggregate unemployment rate. \( v \) aggregate vacancies. \( \varepsilon_{e|z} \) low: \( \phi = 2 \) and \( b = 0.8 \) to match \( u = 4.86 \). Exogenous search effort.

Exogenous separation.

Endogenous separation.

Exogenous separation, endogenous search effort.

We change the opportunity cost of employment in order to maintain the same level of aggregate unemployment in each model.

a good approximation of the data for prime age workers, but it is not able to fully account for life-cycle features. Results in Table 10 also show that a model with constant search effort fails to generate the magnitude of fluctuations observed on the aggregate of the labor market. As in Fujita & Ramey (2012), this model with constant search effort generate a positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies, which is counterfactual.

Our simulation results underline the interactions between search effort and endogenous separations: these mechanisms allow a better match with the data than the sum of these two channels, taken independently. This comes from the fact that, with an endogenous search effort, reservation productivity is more sensitive to aggregate shocks, leading older workers \( JSR \) and \( JFR \) to be more volatile. Indeed, we stressed in section 3.5.2 that, in Equation (14), the response of reservation productivity to the business cycle is mainly driven by current changes in aggregate productivity and fluctuations in the expected gains from search on the labor market \( \Sigma \), given the restriction parameters at the steady state. The response of expected gains from search is magnified when search effort is endogenous. There lies the interaction between endogenous separation and endogenous workers’ search effort. When considering response of reservation productivity by age, we underlined in section 3.5.2 that expected gains from search differ by age. We argue here that it is all the more the case when search effort is endogenous. In booms, younger workers are less willing to remain within the firm as outside opportunities are expanding, all the more so when workers’ search effort is endogenous. This widens the volatility gap between old workers’ worker flows and their younger counterparts’.

4.3 Wage cyclicality

We first present stylized fact based on monthly CPS data, and secondly discuss the implications of our model in terms of wage age-dynamics. We then compare the model’s
cyclical properties with the observed volatility of real hourly wage.

**Real wage in the data.** Figure 2 reports the descriptive statistics for male real hourly wages and weekly earnings.\(^{40}\) The level of wages increases between younger and prime-age workers, and declines at the end of the life-cycle, which is consistent with the view that experience makes workers more productive until the age when the depreciation of the human capital becomes faster.

![Figure 2: Real wage by age](image)

3 age-groups, CPS quarterly averages of monthly data, Men, 1979 Q1 - 2013Q2. “Std Dev” : Standard deviation of logged HP-filtered data (with smoothing parameter \(10^7\)). All moments are estimated using GMM, with a weighting matrix corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using Newey & West (1987)’s method. 95% confidence band. Authors’ calculations.

Cyclical wage volatility is U-shaped over ages, though the gaps between age volatilities are not significant. It seems to be inconsistent with our findings on worker flows and unemployment stock, which would imply an age-decreasing profile for wages, as, in a market with more rigid prices, the large part of adjustments would fall on quantities. However, the decline in the wage volatility over ages would be relevant in a model with a representative worker by age class, i.e. a model with an exogenous separation rate. In this case, the age-increase of the volatilities of labor market flows would imply a more rigid wage for the older workers. As this property of the wage dynamics per age is not observed, this gives some support to a model with endogenous separations where the average wage dynamics are the composition of the ones of the individual wages with the ones of the productivity distribution of job-worker pairs, as it is the case in or model. Indeed, in our model, individual wages differ from the average wage, as the latter takes into account changes in employment composition. For older workers, the horizon effect generates wage rigidity in individual wages. However, the composition of older workers’ employment also responds to the business cycle.\(^{41}\)

---

\(^{40}\)See appendix B.1 for a description of the data.

\(^{41}\)See the appendix B.2 for a analytical discussion.
Real wage in the model. Table 11 compares the model prediction with the data. Only the model with search effort and endogenous separation generates a U-shape pattern of the wage volatilities per age. As suggested above, the fluctuations in the average productivity seem to reduce the (average) wage fluctuations. This is why the benchmark model generates smaller volatilities than the model with exogenous separations. Consistently, the volatility of older workers’ average wage is larger than prime-age workers’, since this dampening effect becomes smaller at the end of the life-cycle.

Table 11: Second order moments: data versus theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev US</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>0.0124</td>
<td>0.0127</td>
<td>0.0122</td>
<td>0.0123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_{C_2}$ low</td>
<td>0.0131</td>
<td>0.0126</td>
<td>0.0131</td>
<td>0.0133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exo. Sep.</td>
<td>0.0128</td>
<td>0.0130</td>
<td>0.0128</td>
<td>0.0125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

US data: Standard deviation of CPS Monthly HP-filtered logged data, Men, 1979 Q1 - 2013Q2
*$\varepsilon_{C_2}$ low*: $\phi = 2$ and $b = 0.8$ to match $u = 4.86$. Exogenous search effort. Endogenous separation.
*Exo. Sep.*: $\lambda_i = \sigma_\epsilon = 0$, $c_{e,i} = JSR_i$ and $b = 0.8$ to match $u = 4.86$. Exogenous separation, endogenous search effort.
We change the opportunity cost of employment in order to maintain the same level of aggregate unemployment in each model.

Table 11 shows that incomplete models (with low elasticity of search effort, or with exogenous separation rate) perform poorly: the aggregate wage dynamics is driven by the ones of the individual wages. Hence, these findings on the volatilities per age group of the hourly wage can be viewed as additional supports to our findings on worker flows and unemployment stock: in the absence of interactions between endogenous search effort (highly dependent on workers’ horizon) and the job separation rate (highly sensitive to the worker horizon), it seems more difficult to reproduce the age-pattern of wage volatilities.

5 Conclusion

We document business cycle fluctuations in worker flows by age group for the US economy. We extend the current literature by looking at the age profile of both average and volatilities in workers’ transition rates on CPS data. We then develop a life cycle Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) model with age-directed search, endogenous search effort and separations. The model explains that older workers’ shorter horizon endogenously reduces the cyclicity of the outside options, thereby making their wages less sensitive to the business cycle. Thus, in a market where wage adjustments are small, quantities vary considerably. This is the case for older workers, whereas their younger counterparts

Notice that we obtain promising results with respect to the age-pattern of the wage cyclicalities, but the model slightly under-predicts the level of these wage volatilities.
behave like infinitively lived agents. Furthermore, the horizon effect cannot explain the significant volatility differences between prime-age workers and young workers because both age groups are far away from retirement. The lower bargaining power for young workers consistent with their weaker union affiliation allows us to replicate the volatility of their transition rates.

We also show that search effort and endogenous separations provide useful mechanisms to magnify the volatility gaps across ages as well as to understand the dynamics of the aggregate labor market: the complementarity between the search strategies of firms and workers generates a significant amplification mechanism. Endogenous separations also help the model match aggregate volatilities. Moreover, workers’ pro-cyclical search efforts reduce firms’ incentives to use recessions to change the composition of their workforce, leading the model to generate a Beveridge curve.

We subscribe to the view that understanding the age-differences of unemployment are important because (i) one needs to discipline any employment policy issue using data coming from different age groups, and (ii) there is a valid concern that aggregation may conceal the forces driving the responses of the aggregates to policy reforms. We propose in this paper a model that could be used to start thinking about the business cycle effects of policy reforms across age-groups.
References


Mukoyama, T., Patterson, C. & Sahin, A. (2014), Job search behavior over the business cycle, Staff Reports 689, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.


Online Appendix

A Stylized facts on worker flows

A.1 Alternative age-groups

We divide the working life into 10 age groups: 16-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, and 60-64. Each age group includes individuals with a maximum age difference of 5 years, except for younger workers, where the minimum working age is the lower bound. Figure 3 reports the mean of the time series. It appears that JFR and JSR are age-decreasing. Compared to the 40-44 age group (the reference group), JFR is significantly larger for workers below 30 years of age, and significantly lower for workers aged 55+. Given the highest accuracy of the estimates for JSR, these gaps become significant for workers less than 34 years old, and those older than 50.

Figure 3: Job Separation Rate JSR, Job Finding Rate JFR, and Unemployment u by age

The cyclical behavior of logged transition rates are obtained using HP filter with a smoothing parameter of $10^5$. Volatility of fluctuations in logged transition rates display a significant age-increasing pattern. Figure 3 shows that older workers have significantly larger standard deviations than prime-age workers do. Indeed, workers older than 54 have a significantly larger standard deviation than those in the 40-44 age group. For young workers, significant differences appear between those younger...
than 24 and prime-age workers. The cyclical behavior of the unemployment rate also contains age-increasing volatility. Nevertheless, this feature is less pronounced than for worker flows because the variance of the unemployment rate, given by \( E[\hat{u}^2] = (1-u)^2 \{E[\hat{JSR}^2] + E[\hat{JFR}^2] - 2E[\hat{JSR}\hat{JFR}]\} \), is dampened at the end of the life cycle by covariances between JSR and JFR \( E[\hat{JSR}\hat{JFR}] \), which are less negative than for prime-age workers. Overall, we synthesize the age-pattern of labor market stock and flows based on these first results by considering only three age groups: 16-24, 25-54, and, 55-61.

A.2 HP-filtering with \( \lambda = 1600 \)

Table 12 reports business cycle facts when the smoothing parameter is 1600 rather than \( 10^5 \). The age-increasing pattern in volatility is robust.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All: 16-61</th>
<th>16-24</th>
<th>25-54</th>
<th>55-61</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>0.084492</td>
<td>0.077361</td>
<td>0.10856</td>
<td>0.17571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.7126</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6186 (a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFR</td>
<td>0.11897</td>
<td>0.1219</td>
<td>0.12439</td>
<td>0.18647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.98094</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>0.16976</td>
<td>0.13661</td>
<td>0.19427</td>
<td>0.25264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.7032</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(JSR)* Job Separation Rate. *(JFR)* Job Finding Rate. *(u)* unemployment rate.

(a) Old workers’ JSR volatility equals 1.6186 times prime-age workers’. Small numbers refer to values relative to prime-age workers’.

A.3 Accounting for inactivity

Using Shimer (2012)’s methodology for 3 employment states (Employment, Unemployment and Inactivity), on CPS data for Men, we obtain the results reported in Tables 13 and 14. With 3 employment states, steady state unemployment includes all transitions rates, including those involving inactivity. Tables 13 and 14 suggest that our business cycle facts across age groups remain robust when separations and findings are purged from the transition to and from inactivity. Exit from employment as well as the job finding rate fall with age while their volatility increases with age.

When we decompose unemployment fluctuations using \( \beta \) decomposition as in Shimer (2012), based on hypothetical unemployment rates, we find that the transitions between unemployment and unemployment account for 76% of unemployment fluctuations.\(^{43}\)

\(^{43}\)We compute counter-factual steady states predicted by time varying finding and separation rates, while other transition rates are set at their historical mean. We log and HP-filter the time series using a smoothing parameter of \( 10^5 \) and compute the variance decomposition of the cyclical component of steady state unemployment based on \( \beta s \). We find that \( \beta_{EU} + \beta_{UE} = 0.7575 \).
Table 13: Mean. Quarterly averages of monthly CPS data, 3 states (Employment, Unemployment, Inactivity), 1976Q1 - 2013Q1, Men. Authors' calculations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All: 16-61</th>
<th>16-24</th>
<th>25-54</th>
<th>55-61</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JSR (eu)</td>
<td>0.022289</td>
<td>0.049672</td>
<td>0.017704</td>
<td>0.012269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.8057</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.69298 (a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFR (ue)</td>
<td>0.38394</td>
<td>0.41585</td>
<td>0.37888</td>
<td>0.30254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.0976</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.79851</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>0.062021</td>
<td>0.12627</td>
<td>0.049089</td>
<td>0.045553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.5723</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.92796</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ei</td>
<td>0.017989</td>
<td>0.060717</td>
<td>0.009086</td>
<td>0.01725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ui</td>
<td>0.25019</td>
<td>0.38769</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.2178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ie</td>
<td>0.087675</td>
<td>0.10631</td>
<td>0.089063</td>
<td>0.039792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iu</td>
<td>0.094369</td>
<td>0.12409</td>
<td>0.097061</td>
<td>0.026687</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"JSR" Job Separation Rate. "JFR" Job Finding Rate. "u" unemployment rate. "ei" transition rate from employment to inactivity. "ui" transition rate from unemployment to inactivity. "ie" transition rate from inactivity to employment. "iu" transition rate from inactivity to unemployment.

(a) Old workers' JSR equals 0.69298 times prime-age workers'. Small numbers refer to values relative to prime-age workers'.

Table 14: Standard deviation. Quarterly averages of monthly CPS logged data, 3 states (Employment, Unemployment, Inactivity), 1976Q1 - 2013Q1, Men. Logged HP-filtered data with smoothing parameter $10^5$. Authors' calculations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All: 16-61</th>
<th>16-24</th>
<th>25-54</th>
<th>55-61</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>0.10936</td>
<td>0.095019</td>
<td>0.14095</td>
<td>0.19785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.67413</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4037 (a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFR</td>
<td>0.15626</td>
<td>0.15902</td>
<td>0.1637</td>
<td>0.21629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.97144</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3213</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>0.21511</td>
<td>0.15902</td>
<td>0.25506</td>
<td>0.29212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.62344</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1453</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ei</td>
<td>0.066495</td>
<td>0.073621</td>
<td>0.074905</td>
<td>0.10924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ui</td>
<td>0.13181</td>
<td>0.098655</td>
<td>0.15932</td>
<td>0.23929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ie</td>
<td>0.094361</td>
<td>0.11697</td>
<td>0.10092</td>
<td>0.12961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iu</td>
<td>0.09026</td>
<td>0.09714</td>
<td>0.12326</td>
<td>0.23116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"JSR" Job Separation Rate. "JFR" Job Finding Rate. "u" unemployment rate. "ei" transition rate from employment to inactivity. "ui" transition rate from unemployment to inactivity. "ie" transition rate from inactivity to employment. "iu" transition rate from inactivity to unemployment.

(a) Old workers' JSR equals 1.4037 times prime-age workers'. Small numbers refer to values relative to prime-age workers'.
**A.4 Employment and Unemployment for all workers**

Using Shimer (2012)’s methodology for 2 employment states (Employment, Unemployment), on CPS data for Men and women, we get results reported in Tables 15 and 16. The main stylized facts remain relevant: the mean transition rates fall with age while their volatility increases with age.

Table 15: Mean. Quarterly averages of monthly CPS data, Employment and Unemployment, 1976Q1 - 2013Q1, Men and Women. Authors’ calculations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All: 16-61</th>
<th>16-24</th>
<th>25-54</th>
<th>55-61</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>0.018792</td>
<td>0.042009</td>
<td>0.015466</td>
<td>0.010627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.7162</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.68713 (a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFR</td>
<td>0.42404</td>
<td>0.49514</td>
<td>0.39915</td>
<td>0.33679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2405</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.84376</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>0.044798</td>
<td>0.081417</td>
<td>0.039634</td>
<td>0.03305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.0542</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.83387</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*“JSR” Job Separation Rate. “JFR” Job Finding Rate. “u” unemployment rate.*

(a) Old workers’ average JSR equals 0.68713 times prime-age workers’. Small numbers refer to values relative to prime-age workers’.

Table 16: Standard deviation. Quarterly averages of monthly CPS data, Employment and Unemployment, 1976Q1 - 2013Q1, Men and Women, logged HP-filtered data with smoothing parameter 10^5. Authors’ calculations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All: 16-61</th>
<th>16-24</th>
<th>25-54</th>
<th>55-61</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>0.086295</td>
<td>0.069806</td>
<td>0.11134</td>
<td>0.16103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.62694</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4463 (a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFR</td>
<td>0.15671</td>
<td>0.14693</td>
<td>0.16161</td>
<td>0.20154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.90912</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.247</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>0.21221</td>
<td>0.16513</td>
<td>0.2388</td>
<td>0.28343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.6915</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1869</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*“JSR” Job Separation Rate. “JFR” Job Finding Rate. “u” unemployment rate.*

(a) Old workers’ JSR volatility equals 1.4463 times prime-age workers’. Small numbers refer to values relative to prime-age workers’.

**A.5 Robustness check using Elsby et al. (2010)’s data**

We consider an alternative method of computing transition rates. Elsby et al. (2010) use Shimer (2012)’s formula based on quarterly stocks of unemployed and employed workers (in which separations are proxied by short-term unemployment) rather than disaggregated data as we do. Their approach yields higher levels of transition rates. In order to test the sensitivity of our results to the transition rate calculation method, we re-compute the same business cycle statistics on their database using their methodology. Since the time series are now quarterly, the smoothing parameter on the HP filter is equal to 1600. The results are reported in Tables 17 and 18. We do find that the levels of transition rates fall with age while the standard deviations increase with age.
Table 17: Mean. Elsby et al. (2010) data, 1977Q2 - 2009Q4, Quarterly data, Men and Women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All: 16+</th>
<th>Young: 16-24</th>
<th>Prime-age: 25-54</th>
<th>Old: 55+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>0.03527</td>
<td>0.10047</td>
<td>0.023898</td>
<td>0.015542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFR</td>
<td>0.54514</td>
<td>0.7111</td>
<td>0.46652</td>
<td>0.43876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*JSR* Job Separation Rate. *JFR* Job Finding Rate.

(a) Old workers' average JSR equals 0.65034 times prime-age workers'. Small numbers refer to values relative to prime-age workers'.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All: 16+</th>
<th>Young: 16-24</th>
<th>Prime-age: 25-54</th>
<th>Old: 55+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>0.044485</td>
<td>0.046366</td>
<td>0.060651</td>
<td>0.092973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFR</td>
<td>0.10627</td>
<td>0.095022</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.15079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*JSR* Job Separation Rate. *JFR* Job Finding Rate.

(a) Old workers' JSR volatility equals 1.5329 times prime-age workers'. Small numbers refer to values relative to prime-age workers'.

A.6 Employment and unemployment per skill

The data per age can mix an age effect and a skill effect. In order to deal with this identification problem, we propose to distinguish two skill groups (high school diploma and less, and college or more).

Table 19: Mean. Monthly CPS data, Employment and Unemployment, 1976Q1 - 2013Q1, Men. Authors’ calculations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High school and less</th>
<th>College and more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16-24 25-54 55-61</td>
<td>16-24 25-54 55-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>0.065079 0.027775 0.016455</td>
<td>0.034743 0.012331 0.0085209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFR</td>
<td>0.45922 0.42343 0.35042</td>
<td>0.56922 0.39952 0.30959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>0.12986 0.06568 0.050573</td>
<td>0.062228 0.032214 0.029889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*JSR* Job Separation Rate. *JFR* Job Finding Rate. *u* unemployment rate.

(a) Old workers' average JSR equals 0.59242 times prime-age workers'. Small numbers refer to values relative to prime-age workers'.

After controlling for educational attainment, the levels are age-decreasing and the volatilities are age-increasing. Thus, our stylized facts account for phenomena linked to worker age, and are not the result of a composition effect.
Table 20: Standard deviation. Employment and Unemployment, Monthly CPS data, 1976Q1 - 2013Q1, Men, logged HP-filtered data, smoothing parameter $10^5$, Authors’ calculations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High school and less</th>
<th>College and more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16-24 25-54 55-61</td>
<td>16-24 25-54 55-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>0.11934 0.16678 0.24422</td>
<td>0.15384 0.1669 0.27525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.71555 1 1.4643 (a)</td>
<td>0.92172 1 1.6492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFR</td>
<td>0.1803 0.17097 0.27954</td>
<td>0.19894 0.18454 0.28459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.0546 1 1.635</td>
<td>1.078 1 1.5421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>0.20022 0.27448 0.36584</td>
<td>0.24774 0.30167 0.38679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.72945 1 1.3328</td>
<td>0.82122 1 1.2822</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Old workers’ JSR volatility equals 1.4643 times prime-age workers’. Small numbers refer to values relative to prime-age workers’.

A.7 Contributions of age-specific transition rates to aggregate fluctuations

A.7.1 The contribution of age-specific transition rates to aggregate transition rates

Let us consider the economy at the conditional steady state in which unemployment ins equal unemployment outs. We use the following decomposition to measure the contribution of each age group in the fluctuations of the aggregate job flows:

$$ x_t = \sum_i x_{i,t} \omega_{i,t} \Rightarrow \hat{x}_t \approx \sum_i p_i \hat{x}_{i,t} + \sum_i p_i \hat{\omega}_{i,t} $$

with $x = JSR$ ($x = JFR$) then $\omega_i = n_i/n$ ($\omega_i = u_i/u$), knowing that $p_i = \frac{JSR(n_i/n)}{JSR} = \frac{JFR(n_i/u)}{JFR}$. $\hat{x}$ denotes log deviation with respect to the mean. We denote $\beta_i^x$ as the contribution of age-i worker flow $x_i$ to the variance of the corresponding aggregate job flow $x$. Following Shimer (2012), we have:

$$ E[(\hat{x}_t)^2] \approx \sum_i p_i E[\hat{x}_{i,t}^2] + \sum_i p_i E[\hat{\omega}_{i,t}^2] \Rightarrow 1 \approx \sum_i \beta_i^x + \sum_i \beta_i^{\omega} $$

We can then decompose the contribution of each age group to the total volatility into two elements: the first one captures the volatility of age-specific transition rate and the second is associated with changes in the age composition of labor flows. To compute these statistics, we use the employment and unemployment conditional steady states, and the time series of worker flows.

A.7.2 The contribution of age-specific transition rates to aggregate unemployment fluctuations

In this section, to simplify the notation, job separation rate is denoted $s$ and job finding is denoted $f$. 
The unemployment volatility for age-i workers. For each state \( z \), the unemployment rate for the age-i worker is given by

\[
u_{i,z} = \frac{s_{i,z}}{s_{i,z} + f_{i,z}} = \tilde{v}(\pi_i(1 + \varepsilon_{i,s}), \tilde{f}_i(1 + \varepsilon_{i,f})) \quad \text{with} \quad \begin{cases} f_{i,z} = \tilde{f}_i(1 + \varepsilon_{i,f}) \\ s_{i,z} = \tilde{\pi}_i(1 + \varepsilon_{i,s}) \end{cases}
\]

implying that \( \varepsilon_{i,x} = \frac{x-\tilde{x}}{\tilde{x}} \approx \log(x/\tilde{x}) \) for \( x = s, f \). Within each age-group, the volatility of the unemployment rate is given by

\[
Var(\log(\nu_i)) = \sum_t \pi(z_t)(\log(\nu_{i,t}) - \log(\pi_i))^2 = \sum_t \pi(z_t)(\log(\tilde{v}(\pi_i(1 + \varepsilon_{s,i,t}), \tilde{f}_i(1 + \varepsilon_{f,i,t}))) - \log(\pi_i))^2 \\
\approx (1 - \pi_i)^2 [\sigma^2_{s,i} + \sigma^2_{f,i} - 2\text{cov}(s_i, f_i)]
\]

Using the approximation of the steady state unemployment rate by age (\( \tilde{\nu}_i = \log(u_i/\pi_i) = (1 - \pi_i)(\tilde{s}_i - \tilde{f}_i) \)), we deduce the contributions of each transition rate in the unemployment fluctuations:

\[
E(\tilde{\nu}_i^2) = E[(1 - \pi_i)\tilde{s}_i\tilde{u}_i] + E[(1 - \pi_i)(-\tilde{f}_i)\tilde{u}_i] \\
\Rightarrow 1 = \frac{(1 - \tilde{\pi}_i)^2(\sigma^2_{s,i} - \text{cov}(s_i, f_i)) + (1 - \tilde{\pi}_i)^2(\sigma^2_{f,i} - \text{cov}(s_i, f_i))}{\sigma^2_{s,i}} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad 1 = \beta_i^{u,s} + \beta_i^{u,f}
\]

Aggregate unemployment. At the conditional steady state, the impact of the age specific volatilities of \( JFR_i \) and \( JSR_i \) on the fluctuations of the aggregate unemployment is deduced from

\[
Var(\log(u)) = \sum_t \pi(z_t) \left( \log \left( \sum_i \varsigma_i u_{i,t} \right) - \log \left( \sum_i \varsigma_i \pi_i \right) \right)^2 \\
\approx \sum_t \pi(z_t) \left( \frac{1}{\sum_i \varsigma_i u_{i,t}} \sum_i \varsigma_i \left[ \varepsilon_{s,i,t} \tilde{s}_i \tilde{u}'_1(\tilde{s}_i, \tilde{f}_i) + \varepsilon_{f,i,t} \tilde{f}_i \tilde{u}'_2(\tilde{s}_i, \tilde{f}_i) \right] \right)^2 \\
\approx \varsigma^2 \left( \frac{\pi_y}{\bar{\pi}} \right)^2 \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}} \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}_A} \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}_O} \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}_F} \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}_A} \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}_O} \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}_F} \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}_A} \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}_O} \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}_F} \\
+ 2 \left( \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}} \right)^2 \left[ \varsigma_{sA} (1 - u_Y) u_A (1 - u_A) \left( \text{cov}(s_Y, s_A) - \text{cov}(f_Y, s_A) - \text{cov}(f_Y, f_A) \right) + \varsigma_{sO} (1 - u_O) u_O (1 - u_O) \left( \text{cov}(s_O, s_O) - \text{cov}(f_O, s_O) - \text{cov}(f_O, f_O) \right) + \varsigma_{sF} (1 - u_F) u_F (1 - u_F) \left( \text{cov}(s_F, s_F) - \text{cov}(f_F, s_F) - \text{cov}(f_F, f_F) \right) \right]
\]

where the weight of each age-class in working age population is \( \varsigma_a \). These weights are those used in the calibrated model. By rearranging this formula, we can obtain the contribution of each age-specific transition rates in the volatility of aggregate unemployment:

\[
\begin{align*}
\beta_{f_i}^u &= \frac{\varsigma^2 \left( \frac{\pi_y}{\bar{\pi}} \right)^2 (1 - \tilde{\pi}_i)^2 [\sigma^2_{s,f} - \text{cov}(s_i, f_i)] + \left( \frac{u_i(1 - u_i)}{\bar{\pi}} \right) \sum_{j \neq i} \varsigma_j u_j (1 - u_j) [\text{cov}(f_i, f_j) - \text{cov}(f_i, s_j)]}{Var(\log(u))} \\
\beta_{s_i}^u &= \frac{\varsigma^2 \left( \frac{\pi_y}{\bar{\pi}} \right)^2 (1 - \tilde{\pi}_i)^2 [\sigma^2_{s,s} - \text{cov}(s_i, f_i)] + \left( \frac{u_i(1 - u_i)}{\bar{\pi}} \right) \sum_{j \neq i} \varsigma_j u_j (1 - u_j) [\text{cov}(s_i, s_j) - \text{cov}(f_i, s_j)]}{Var(\log(u))}
\end{align*}
\]
which satisfies $1 = \sum_i (\beta_i^u + \beta_i^u)$.

### A.8 The conditional correlations: a structural VAR

In this section, we provide evidence that our stylized facts (based on unconditional standard deviation of labor flows by age group) are robust when considering responses to structural shocks in a structural VAR. Old workers’ response of job finding and job separation to aggregate shocks remain larger than their younger counterparts.

We follow Fujita (2011) who uses structural VARs with sign restrictions in order to study US worker reallocation along the business cycle. We estimate a structural VAR for each age group (1976Q1-2013Q2). A first trivariate VAR includes US CPI inflation, job separation and finding for male young workers. The second (and third) VAR includes US CPI inflation, job separation and finding for male prime-age (old) workers. As in Fujita (2011), we detrend the data using deterministic quadratic trends. Lag length is set to 1 based on the AIC criteria. We impose sign restrictions to identify two aggregate shocks (supply and demand) and a reallocation shock. All sign restrictions are imposed for 1 quarter.

- **Restriction 1: the supply shock.** In response to a positive aggregate supply shock, inflation and job separation respond negatively, while job finding increases.

- **Restriction 2: the demand shock.** In response to a positive aggregate demand shock, job separation responds negatively, while inflation and job finding increase.

- **Restriction 3: the reallocation shock.** In response to a positive reallocation shock, job separation and job finding both increase.

Impulse Response Functions (IRF) to a one-standard-deviation shock are reported in Figure 4. In response to an aggregate shock (whether supply or demand shock), older workers’ job finding and separation respond more than their younger counterparts’.

The estimations of the probability that older workers’ IRF lies above their younger counterpart’s median IRF are reported in Table 1 in section 2.

### B Wage across age groups

#### B.1 Average real hourly wage by age in CPS data

We compute the average real hourly wage by age in order to compute the empirical targets $w_A/w_Y$ and $w_O/w_Y$ in Table 4. Using monthly CEPR MORG data between January 1979 and June 2013, we document the business cycle response of male real hourly wages ($w$). Hourly wage is usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours. Data represent earnings before taxes and other deductions and include any overtime pay, commissions, or tips usually received. The data excludes all self-employed persons, regardless of whether their businesses are incorporated. After dealing with
Median IRFs to aggregate structural shocks identified using a VAR on US data (1976Q1-2013Q2). Authors’ calculations.

outliers\textsuperscript{44}, we divide the time series of nominal hourly wages by a trend derived from the aggregate wage time-series. This trend captures long-term increases in inflation and technology. After correcting for seasonal movements using x12, we consider the quarterly averages of monthly observations and then look at logged-HP filtered real hourly wages using $10^5$ as a smoothing parameter. We check that levels of real hourly wages are consistent with findings in Heathcote et al. (2010), as well as BLS data on weekly earnings by age. We also check that business cycle features are close to Jaimovich & Siu (2009)’s statistics on annual wage data. We get age-increasing levels of real hourly wages, which is consistent with the view that experience makes workers more productive. We then compute $w_A/w_Y$ and $w_O/w_Y$, values are reported in Table 4.

B.2 Wage cyclicality: From theory to data

One might wonder what are the model’s predictions with respect to wage volatility by age, and compare the model’s predictions with the corresponding data. In this section, we argue that answering this question would not be very informative.

In the data. Using CEPR-MORG data, we can compute only average real hourly wage by age group, not individual wages.

\textsuperscript{44}Hourly wages higher than 250 US dollars, wages less than half the net minimum wage, and young workers working more than 45 hours per week
In the model. Wages are heterogeneous within each age group because each job has a match-specific productivity. Thus, the model generates a wage distribution by age. If we want to compare the model predictions with wages in the data, it is then necessary to compute an average wage by age group, defined as follows:

\[ W_i(z) = \gamma_i z \mathcal{G}(R_i(z)) + (1 - \gamma_i) (b + \Sigma_i(z)) \]  

where \( \mathcal{G}(R_i(z)) = \frac{1}{n_i(z)} \int_{R_i(z)}^1 x dn_i(z, x) \) denotes the average productivity of age-\(i\) workers, \(dn_i(z, x)\) is the number of age-\(i\) employees on a \(x\)-productivity job. This distribution is endogenous and subject to cyclical changes, and depends on the cyclical changes in separation, finding, and productivity changes: \(dn_i(z, \epsilon)\) changes with the business cycle. Given that the average wage depends on both individual wages and the wage distribution, a rigid individual wage and a volatile average wage could be mutually consistent. The log-linear approximation of equation (15) leads to:

\[ \bar{W}_i = \gamma_i z \frac{\mathcal{G}(R_i)}{W_i} \left( \varepsilon + \hat{G}_i \right) + (1 - \gamma_i) \frac{\Sigma_i}{W_i} \hat{\Sigma}_i \text{ with } \hat{G}_i = \Gamma_i^z \varepsilon + \Gamma_i^r \hat{R}_i + \Gamma_i^\gamma \hat{\Sigma}_i \]

where the term \( \hat{G}_i \) accounts for the changes in the job composition on wage fluctuations.\(^{45}\) The parameters \( \Gamma_i^z \), \( \Gamma_i^r \) and \( \Gamma_i^\gamma \equiv \gamma_i^z \Sigma_i \) are the elasticities of the average productivity with respect to \(z\), \(R_i\), and \(\Sigma_i\), respectively.\(^{46}\) This approximation underlines the channels through which average productivity changes, and depends on the cyclical changes in separation, finding, and productivity changes: \( dn_i(z, \epsilon) \) changes with the business cycle. The signs of these elasticities \( \Gamma_i^x \), for \(x = z, r, s\), are ambiguous. Aggregate productivity \(z\) has a positive effect on aggregate employment, and thus lowers average productivity, but also raises employment at each level of the productivity distribution through its impact on search efforts \((e_i(z) \text{ and } \theta_i(z))\). In boom, the fall in \(R_i\) increases the set of jobs \(\text{(the integral has a larger span)}\) but lowers their quality \(\text{(more jobs are concentrated at the bottom)}\). Moreover, when \(R_i\) declines, employment increases, thus average productivity falls. Finally, a rise in the search value \(\Sigma_i\) reduces incentives to post new vacancies. This has a negative effect on the two dimensions of employment: by reducing its aggregate level, it raises average productivity, whereas its negative effect on each point lowers average productivity. Finally, we deduce that the average wage dynamics is given by:

\[ \bar{W}_i = \gamma_i z \frac{\mathcal{G}(R_i)}{W_i} \left( (1 + \Gamma_i^z) \varepsilon + \Gamma_i^r \hat{R}_i + \Gamma_i^\gamma \hat{\Sigma}_i \right) + (1 - \gamma_i) \frac{\Sigma_i}{W_i} \hat{\Sigma}_i \]

Thus, for older workers, i.e., when \(\Sigma_O \to 0\), the average wage can be proxied by:

\[ \bar{W}_O = \gamma_i z \frac{\mathcal{G}(R_i)}{W_i} \left( (1 + \Gamma_i^z) \varepsilon + \Gamma_i^r \hat{R}_O \right) \]

This shows that this average wage can be highly pro-cyclical if \(\Gamma_i^z > 0\) is large enough. Moreover, given that the volatility of the JSR is age-increasing, implying \(\hat{R}_i < \hat{R}_{i+1}\), the impact of \(\hat{R}_O\) on \(\bar{W}_O\) can be reinforced by the large volatility in the reservation productivity.

In a nutshell, in our model, individual wages differ from the average wage, as the latter takes into

---

\(^{45}\)See Appendix E.5 for the derivation of the formula for \(\hat{G}_i\)

\(^{46}\)The notation \(\Gamma_i^z \equiv \gamma_i^z \Sigma_i\) allows us to use the property that \(\Gamma_i^z \to 0\) for older workers, simply because \(\Sigma_O \to 0\), and \(\gamma_O^z\) is bounded.
account changes in employment composition. For older workers, the horizon effect generates wage rigidity in individual wages. However, the composition of older workers’ employment also responds to the business cycle. The final effect of workers’ age on the volatility of average wage is therefore theoretically ambiguous.

C Empirical evidence on search effort

We present (i) the methods allowing to measure the search effort, (ii) the debate on its cyclicality, and (iii) its age pattern.

C.1 Measuring search effort

There are two main data sets used to measure search effort by unemployed workers: the first one, the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), provides a measure of the time spent on job-searching activities per day, whereas the second, the Current Population Survey (CPS), gives an indirect measure via the types and number of search methods used. If the first measure is the most natural quantitative proxy for job search effort, ATUS suffers from its small sample size and its short sample period (starting in 2003), unlike the CPS.

C.2 Pro-cyclicality of aggregate search effort

Shimer (2004) uses CPS data to build an indirect measure of search effort (the number of methods used). His main result is that this search effort measure is counter-cyclical. These first investigations are supported by the more recent work of Mukoyama et al. (2014) who use CPS data to infer the average time used to search for job prior to the ATUS sample. Nevertheless, the results reported by Mukoyama et al. (2014) cast some doubt on the quality of the econometric method allowing to compute this "imputed" time used to search for a job. In particular, if one looks at unemployed workers, the "actual" and the "imputed" time series are consistent only during the periods 2007-2008, displaying counter-cyclical movements during the periods 2003-2007 and 2009-2011. Moreover, the use of this measure of search effort proposed in Shimer’s pioneer work has been criticized by Tumen (2014) who shows that the probability of exiting unemployment is a decreasing function of the number of search methods, whereas, if he uses the number of search methods per week unemployed as an alternative measure of search effort, search intensity becomes strongly pro-cyclical. This result confirms the one in DeLoach & Kurt (2013). After controlling for composition bias, Gomme & Lkhagvasuren (2015) also find that search effort (measured by time spent on this activity) is strongly pro-cyclical. Moreover, Gomme & Lkhagvasuren (2015) underline that (i) the "OLS regressions of search time on the number of search methods delivers a very low $R^2$, well below 10%, even after controlling for the individual level characteristics" and (ii) "despite the positive individual-level link between the two variables, they do not move in the same direction over the business cycle".

---

47 This regression shows that a unit increase in search methods is correlated with a 10 minute increase in search time. This positive correlation between the two measures is also underlined by Mukoyama et al. (2014)
These empirical findings favor the view that the supply side of labor market adjustments (via search effort) can complement the demand driven adjustments, usually analyzed in the simplified version of the DMP model. Given that the measure of search effort is highly debated in the literature, one can favor the empirical approaches that use worker flows to estimate the dynamics of search effort. This is the path followed by Hornstein & Kudlyak (2016) who show that structural estimation of worker flows cannot reject the scenario of a pro-cyclical job search effort, if the weight of vacancies in the matching function is small enough. These results echo the ones in Elsby et al. (2015) who note that a counter-cyclical search effort is difficult to reconcile with movements in the Beveridge curve during and after the Great Recession.

C.3 Levels of search effort by age

C.3.1 Levels of search effort falls with age

Regarding search effort by age based on the ATUS data (the direct measure of the search effort), Aguiar et al. (2013) find that search effort has an inverted U-shaped profile with age.\footnote{These results based on the direct measure of search intensity are in accordance with those provided by Mukoyama et al. (2014).} Nevertheless, using time use surveys in the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain (MTUS), they also show that search effort is an age-decreasing in all other countries. Hence, the US appear as an outliers with respect to this behavior. Aguiar et al. (2013) do not provide any hint about the reason why the US seems an outlier. We suggest that this surprising result for the US comes from the use of the raw ATUS data, whereas some other components of the time use are age specific. With respect to Aguiar et al. (2013), we measure search effort as search activities divided by total time available during the day, which differs across age groups. This point is very important: the available time appears shorter for young people than for their older counterpart (11.90 hours a day for respondents younger than 34, 13.6 hours a day for prime age respondents of 35-54 years old, 13.3 hours for 55-70 years-old), as they spend more time on education, sleeping, eating and drinking. Moreover, we consider respondents with positive search effort, in accordance with the definition of unemployment status. Search effort is then computed as the number of minutes of job search activities divided by the total available time each day (see the presentation of our sample in section C.3.2). Table 21 shows that the older the respondent, the lower the search effort in the US, which is consistent with the empirical pattern found for all countries in Aguiar et al. (2013).

Table 21: Search effort by age group: ATUS data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>22-34</th>
<th>35-54</th>
<th>55+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♯ Obs</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C.3.2 Search effort data in ATUS

In order to estimate search effort by age, we use 2003-2015 waves of the ATUS (American Time Use Survey). The BLS conducts the ATUS based on a sample drawn from the outgoing panel of the CPS...
(Current Population Survey). Each respondent reports activities from the previous day.

- **Total length of each day by age.** In the model, search effort is measured as time spent on activities undertaken to find a job relative to the total length of the period, that is normalized to 1. In the data, the total length of each day can differ across age as time spent on activities that are not modeled in the paper (such as sleep, eating and drinking, education) can differ across age. For each respondent, we compute the sum of activities that individuals do not choose in our model (personal care, eating and drinking, education, respectively mnemonics t01, t11 and t06, with the associated travel time t1801, t1811 and t1806). We then infer the time available for activities that are chosen by economic agents in our model. This available time appears shorter for young people than for their older counterpart, as they spend more time on education, eating and drinking, or personal care.

- **Positive search effort.** Job search activities are recorded under mnemonics 0504 (t050403, t050404, t050405, t050481 and t050499). They include time spent on filling out job application, sending resumes, interviewing, etc... We consider respondents with positive search effort, in accordance with the definition of unemployment status (not employed and looking for a job).

### D Infinite lifetime horizon and endogenous search effort

For expositional simplicity, the disutility of search effort is given by \( \phi(e) = \frac{e^{1+\phi}}{1+\phi} \) and the matching function is given by \( M(v, eu) = v^{1-\eta}(eu)^{\eta} \), with \( \phi > 0 \) and \( \eta \in (0; 1) \).

**Presentation of the model.** A particular case of our model is that with an infinitely lived agent, obtained by setting \( \pi_Y = 1 \). Without loss of generality, we assume in this section that the exogenous separation rate is zero (\( s_e = 0 \)). The elasticities of the vacancies-unemployment ratio (\( \phi^c \)) with respect to aggregate productivity \( z \) are:

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{\phi}^c &= \left( \frac{t^1}{r+JSR} + \frac{\gamma JFR}{(r+\lambda)\eta+\gamma JFR} \right) \frac{1}{1-z} \\
\hat{\phi}^c &= \left( \frac{t^1}{r+JSR+\gamma JFR} + \frac{1}{(r+\lambda)\eta+\gamma JFR} \right) \frac{1}{1-z} \tag{16}
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \tilde{b} = b/z \) and \( \tilde{\phi}^c = \phi^c(\tilde{z})/z \) with \( z \) as the aggregate productivity.

**With exogenous search effort.** In an infinite lifetime horizon model, with exogenous search effort \( \tilde{e} \) and with \( \beta = \frac{1}{1+\tau} \), equilibrium of the labor market is defined by:

\[
\begin{align*}
z \left( R + \frac{\lambda}{r+\lambda} \int_R^1 [1 - G(x)] dx \right) &= b - \phi^c(\tilde{z}) + \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma} \tilde{c} \tilde{e} \\
\tilde{c} \tilde{e} &= (1-\gamma) \frac{z}{r+\lambda} \int_R^1 [1 - G(x)] dx
\end{align*}
\]
Log-linear approximation of this system leads to:

\[
\left( R(r + \lambda) + \lambda \int_{R}^{1}[1 - G(x)]dx \right) \hat{z} + (r + JSR)R\hat{R} = \frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma} \frac{c\theta}{z} (r + \lambda) \hat{\theta} \\
\eta \hat{\theta} = \hat{z} - \frac{1 - G(R)}{\int_{R}^{1}[1 - G(x)]dx} R\hat{R}
\]

Using JC and JD conditions at the steady state,

\[
\begin{align*}
(r + \lambda) \frac{c\theta}{(1 - \gamma)JFR} &= \frac{\int_{R}^{1}[1 - G(x)]dx}{1 - G(R)} \\
(r + \lambda) \frac{zR - (b - \phi(\bar{c}))}{\gamma JFR + JSR - \lambda} &= \frac{\int_{R}^{1}[1 - G(x)]dx}{1 - G(R)} \Rightarrow \begin{cases} 
\int_{R}^{1}[1 - G(x)]dx = \frac{(\gamma JFR + JSR - \lambda)c\theta + (1 - \gamma)JFR(b - \phi(\bar{c}))}{(1 - \gamma)JFR} \\
\int_{R}^{1}[1 - G(x)]dx = \frac{1 - (b - \phi(\bar{c}))}{\gamma JFR + JSR - \lambda}
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

and their log-linear approximations, we deduce:

\[
\left( \frac{(b - \phi(\bar{c}))(1 - \gamma)JFR}{c\theta} + \gamma JFR + JSR + r \right) \hat{z} = ((r + JSR)\eta + \gamma JFR) \hat{\theta}
\]

Given the definition of aggregate productivity:

\[
\bar{z} = \left( R + \int_{R}^{1}[1 - G(x)]dx \right) \frac{1}{1 - G(R)}
\]

and the one of the replacement rate:

\[
\bar{b}_e \equiv \frac{b - \phi(\bar{c})}{\bar{z}} = \frac{b - \phi(\bar{c})}{(\gamma JFR + JSR - \lambda)c\theta + (1 - \gamma)JFR(b - \phi(\bar{c}))} + \frac{\lambda}{(1 - \gamma)JFR} \\
= \frac{(1 - \gamma)JFR\lambda}{\gamma JFR + JSR}(r + \lambda)\theta + \frac{1 - (b - \phi(\bar{c}))}{\gamma JFR + JSR - \lambda}
\]

we obtain:

\[
\frac{(b - \phi(\bar{c}))(1 - \gamma)JFR}{c\theta} = \frac{\bar{b}_e(r + \lambda)(JSR + \gamma JFR) - \bar{b}_e \Gamma}{(1 - \bar{b}_e)\lambda}
\]

where \( \Gamma = (1 - \gamma)JFR + JSR - \lambda \). We then conclude that:

\[
\hat{\theta} = \frac{r + JSR + \gamma JFR}{(r + \lambda)\eta + \gamma JFR \frac{1}{1 - b + \phi(\bar{c})}} \hat{z}
\]

where \( \bar{b}_e = \bar{b} - \phi(\bar{c}) \).
With endogenous search effort. After integrating the FOC on the search effort in both the JC and the JD curves, equilibrium is defined by:

\[ z \left( R + \frac{\lambda}{r + \lambda} \int_{R}^{1} [1 - G(x)] dx \right) = b + \frac{\phi}{1 + \phi} \frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma} c \vartheta \]

\[ c \left( \frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma c} \right) \frac{\varphi}{\zeta} \frac{\varphi}{\zeta} = (1 - \gamma) \frac{z}{r + \lambda} \int_{R}^{1} [1 - G(x)] dx \]

where \( \vartheta = \frac{z}{a} \) and thus \( \vartheta = e \theta \). Log-linear approximations of these two equations lead to:

\[ \left( R(r + \lambda) + \lambda \int_{R}^{1} [1 - G(x)] dx \right) \hat{z} + (r + JSR) \hat{R} = \frac{\phi}{1 + \phi} \frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma} z \hat{\vartheta} \]

\[ \eta \frac{\phi}{1 + \phi} \hat{\vartheta} = \hat{z} - \frac{1 - G(R)}{\int_{R}^{1} [1 - G(x)] dx} \hat{R} \]

Using JC and JD conditions at the steady state,

\[ (r + \lambda) \frac{c \vartheta}{(1 - \gamma) JFR} = z \int_{R}^{1} \frac{[1 - G(x)] dx}{1 - G(R)} \]

\[ (r + \lambda) \frac{z R - b}{\gamma \frac{1 - \gamma}{JFR + JSR - \lambda}} = z \int_{R}^{1} \frac{[1 - G(x)] dx}{1 - G(R)} \]

and their log-linear approximations, we deduce:

\[ \left( \frac{b(1 - \gamma) JFR}{c \vartheta} + \gamma \frac{\phi}{1 + \phi} JFR + JSR + r \right) \hat{z} = \frac{\phi}{1 + \phi} ((r + JSR) \eta + \gamma JFR) \hat{\vartheta} \]

Given the definitions of aggregate productivity and replacement rate

\[ \tilde{b} \equiv \frac{b}{z} = \frac{\left( \frac{b}{\gamma} \right) (1 - \gamma) JFR \lambda}{(\gamma \frac{\phi}{1 + \phi} JFR + JSR) (r + \lambda) \vartheta + (1 - \gamma) JFR \lambda \frac{b}{c} - (1 - \gamma) JFR r \frac{z R - b}{c}} \]

we get:

\[ b(1 - \gamma) JFR \frac{c \vartheta}{\gamma} = \tilde{b}(r + \lambda) \left( JSR + \gamma \frac{\phi}{1 + \phi} JFR \right) - \tilde{b} r \Gamma \]

where \( \Gamma = (1 - \gamma) JFR \frac{z R - b}{c} = \gamma \frac{\phi}{1 + \phi} JFR + JSR - \lambda \). We finally get:

\[ \hat{\vartheta} = \frac{(r + JSR) \frac{1 + \phi}{\phi} + \gamma JFR}{(r + \lambda) \eta + \gamma JFR} \frac{1}{1 - \tilde{b}} \hat{z} \]

Equilibrium Properties

**Proposition 1.** The elasticity of vacancy-to-unemployment ratio with respect to aggregate productivity is higher with endogenous search effort than with constant search effort, given the same calibration targets.
Proof. For given values of observed data \((r, JFR, \text{and } JSR)\), and parameters \((\gamma, \eta, \text{and } b)\), we deduce from (16) that \(\frac{(r+JSR)1+b+\gamma JFR}{(r+\lambda)\eta+\gamma JFR} > \frac{(r+JSR)+\gamma JFR}{(r+\lambda)\eta+\gamma JFR} \) and \(\frac{b}{1-b} > \frac{1}{1-b+\phi(\overline{e})}\), leading unambiguously to \(\frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}}\) variable \(e > \frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}}\) constant \(e\).

Using these first results, we then analyze the worker flow volatilities with and without search effort. **Corollary 1.** There exists a set of realistic parameters such that the volatilities of the job separation and the job finding rates are larger in the model with endogenous search effort than in the model with constant search effort.

**Proof.** Let’s define the log deviations around the steady state values of the job finding rates in economies with and without search effort, as respectively \(\delta JFR\big|_{\text{var } e} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}}\) and \(\delta JFR\big|_{\text{const } e} = (1-\eta)\frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}} - \frac{G(\overline{R})}{1-G(\overline{R})}\). Job separation rates have the same expression for the two economies \(\delta JSR = \varepsilon G(\overline{R})\). Using the free entry conditions, \(\frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}} = \frac{\varepsilon G(\overline{R})}{\varepsilon |\overline{I}_R|} \frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}} + \frac{\varepsilon G(\overline{R})}{\varepsilon |\overline{I}_R|} \frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}}\), we deduce:

\[
\Delta JSR = \frac{\varepsilon G(\overline{R})}{\varepsilon |\overline{I}_R|} \eta \left(1+\phi \right) \frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}} + \frac{\varepsilon G(\overline{R})}{\varepsilon |\overline{I}_R|} \frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}}
\]

\[
\Delta JFR = \frac{\eta}{1+\phi} \frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}} + (1-\eta)\frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}} - \frac{G(\overline{R})}{1-G(\overline{R})} \frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}} \Delta \overline{R}
\]

given that \(\frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}} + \frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}}\). Let’s define \(\overline{w} \in (0;1)\) such that \(\overline{w} = \frac{1}{1-b} = \frac{1}{1-b+\phi(\overline{e})}\). Using (16), we deduce that \(\text{Sign} \left(\Delta JSR\right) = \text{Sign} \left((\overline{w} - 1)(r + JSR) + (\overline{w} - \phi(\overline{e})) \varepsilon JFR\right)\), and it is negative if \(\overline{w} < \phi\). Under this condition, the job separation rate is more countercyclical in a model with endogenous job search. This is then true for \(R\), ie. \(\Delta \overline{R} < 0\). As a result, \(\Delta JFR\) is unambiguously positive because Proposition 1 implies \(\Delta \overline{R} > 0\). Finally, the restrictions on the parameters allowing to obtain this equilibrium are realistic. Indeed, if we take a value for the same home production as Hall & Milgrom (2005), approximatively 0.7, and an elasticity of the job search effort close to one estimated by Christensen et al. (2005), approximatively 0.5, we deduce that \(b = 0.9\) and \(\phi(\overline{e}) = 0.2\) are admissible, by using \(\overline{w} < \phi\) and given that \(b = 0.9\) is lower than the upper bound of the value in Hagendorn & Manovskii (2008). \(\square\)

Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 show that search effort allows the MP model to generate larger volatilities of worker flows than the models with constant search effort.\(^{49}\)

**Proposition 2.** While the correlation between unemployment and vacancies is ambiguous without endogenous search effort, it becomes negative for sufficiently high values for the elasticity of the search effort.

**Proof.** Given \(\theta = \frac{1}{\theta} \Rightarrow \frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}} = -\frac{1}{\phi} \frac{\partial}{\partial \overline{e}}\) and using the log-linear approximation of the FOC on \(e\) (leading to \(\hat{e} = \frac{1}{\phi}\)), we deduce \(\hat{\theta} = \frac{\phi}{1+\phi} \hat{\theta} = \frac{(r+JSR)+\gamma JFR}{(r+\lambda)\eta+\gamma JFR} \frac{1}{1-b} \hat{\theta}\), showing that the "efficient"

\(^{49}\) Note that the case with endogenous search effort converges to the case with constant \(e\) when \(\phi \to \infty\).
labor market tightness is less volatile than the vacancies-unemployment ratio and is bounded \( \hat{\theta} \in \left[ \frac{(r+\text{JSR})}{(r+\lambda)(1-G(R))}, \frac{(r+\text{JSR})+\gamma\text{JFR}}{(r+\lambda)(1-G(R))} \right] \) for respectively \( \phi \to 0 \) and \( \phi \to \infty \). Hence, the dynamics of the Beveridge curve is determined by:

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{With search effort} & \hat{u} = (1-u) \left( \frac{sgn}{1-G(R)} \hat{R} - (1-\eta)\hat{\theta} - \frac{1}{\phi} \hat{\theta} \right) \\
\text{Without search effort} & \hat{u} = (1-u) \left( \frac{sgn}{1-G(R)} \hat{R} - (1-\eta)\hat{\theta} \right)
\end{array}
\]

given that \( \hat{u} = (1-u) \left( J\text{SR} - J\text{JFR} \right) \). Without search effort, if the volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio is small, \( \hat{v} \) can be countercyclical and driven by the dynamics of \( \hat{R} \) allowing to match the volatility of the \( J\text{SR} \). With the endogenous search effort, it exists \( \phi \) such that \( v \) becomes procyclical for bounded values of \( \hat{\theta} \).

In the case without search effort, counter-cyclical separations can amplify the counter-cyclical responses of unemployment to aggregate productivity shocks, and the small response of the vacancy-unemployment ratio can lead to a counter-cyclical response in the vacancy rate (\( \hat{v} = \hat{\theta} + \hat{u} \)). In contrast, with endogenous search effort, a sufficiently small value for \( \phi \) (a high elasticity of search effort) ensures that the vacancy rate is pro-cyclical (\( \hat{v} = \hat{\theta} + \hat{\epsilon} + \hat{u} \) with \( \hat{\epsilon} = \frac{1}{\phi} \hat{\theta} \)), leading then to a negative correlation between \( v \) and \( u \).

## E The Model with Life Cycle Features

We assume again that \( \phi(e) = \frac{e^{1+\phi}}{1+\phi} \) and \( M(v, eu) = v^{1-\eta}(eu)^{\eta} \), with \( \phi > 0 \) and \( \eta \in (0; 1) \).

### E.1 Steady state surplus

The surplus function is defined by:

\[
S_i(z, \epsilon) = \max \left\{ zh_i(e - R_i(z)) + \beta \pi_i(1 - \lambda_i)(1 - s_e)E_z[S_i(z', \epsilon) - S_i(z', R_i(z))] + \beta(1 - \pi_i)(1 - \lambda_{i+1})(1 - s_e)E_z[S_{i+1}(z', \epsilon) - S_{i+1}(z', R_i(z))] : 0 \right\}
\]

Thus, at age \( i + 1 \) and for \( \epsilon = R_i(z) \), we have, at the conditional steady state:

\[
S_{i+1}(z, R_i(z)) = \max \left\{ zh_{i+1}(R_i(z) - R_{i+1}(z)) + \beta \pi_i(1 - \lambda_{i+1})(1 - s_e)S_{i+1}(z, R_i(z)) + \beta(1 - \pi_{i+1})(1 - \lambda_{i+2})(1 - s_e)[S_{i+2}(z, R_i(z)) - S_{i+2}(z, R_{i+1}(z))] : 0 \right\}
\]
Assuming that $S_{i+1}(z, R_i(z)) > 0$, we obtain:

\[
S_{i+1}(z, R_i(z)) = \frac{zh_{i+1}(R_i(z) - R_{i+1}(z))}{1 - \beta \pi_{i+1}(1 - \lambda_i)(1 - s_e)} + \frac{\beta(1 - \pi_{i+1})(1 - \lambda_i)(1 - s_e)}{1 - \beta \pi_{i+1}(1 - \lambda_i)(1 - s_e)} [S_{i+2}(z, R_i(z)) - S_{i+2}(z, R_{i+1}(z))]
\]

For age $i + 2$, we then have:

\[
S_{i+2}(z, R_i(z)) = \frac{zh_{i+2}(R_i(z) - R_{i+2}(z))}{1 - \beta \pi_{i+2}(1 - \lambda_{i+1})(1 - s_e)} + \frac{\beta(1 - \pi_{i+2})(1 - \lambda_{i+1})(1 - s_e)}{1 - \beta \pi_{i+2}(1 - \lambda_{i+2})(1 - s_e)} [S_{i+3}(z, R_i(z)) - S_{i+3}(z, R_{i+2}(z))]
\]

We deduce the value for $S_{i+2}(z, R_i(z)) - S_{i+2}(z, R_{i+1}(z))$, which is:

\[
S_{i+2}(z, R_i(z)) - S_{i+2}(z, R_{i+1}(z)) = \frac{zh_{i+2}(R_i(z) - R_{i+1}(z))}{1 - \beta \pi_{i+2}(1 - \lambda_{i+1})(1 - s_e)} + \frac{\beta(1 - \pi_{i+2})(1 - \lambda_{i+1})(1 - s_e)}{1 - \beta \pi_{i+2}(1 - \lambda_{i+2})(1 - s_e)} [S_{i+3}(z, R_i(z)) - S_{i+3}(z, R_{i+1}(z))]
\]

Introducing this result in the expression of $S_{i+1}(z, R_i(z))$, we obtain:

\[
S_{i+1}(z, R_i(z)) = \frac{zh_{i+1}(R_i(z) - R_{i+1}(z))}{1 - \beta \pi_{i+1}(1 - \lambda_i)(1 - s_e)} + \frac{\beta(1 - \pi_{i+1})(1 - \lambda_i)(1 - s_e)}{1 - \beta \pi_{i+1}(1 - \lambda_i)(1 - s_e)} \left[ \frac{zh_{i+2}(R_i(z) - R_{i+1}(z))}{1 - \beta \pi_{i+2}(1 - \lambda_{i+1})(1 - s_e)} + \frac{\beta(1 - \pi_{i+2})(1 - \lambda_{i+1})(1 - s_e)}{1 - \beta \pi_{i+2}(1 - \lambda_{i+2})(1 - s_e)} [S_{i+3}(z, R_i(z)) - S_{i+3}(z, R_{i+1}(z))] \right]
\]

This leads to $S_{i+1}(z, R_i(z)) = \Omega_{i+1} z (R_i(z) - R_{i+1}(z))$. More generally, the surplus is given by $S_i(z, \epsilon) = \Omega_i z (\epsilon - R_i(z))$, $\forall \epsilon \geq R_i(z)$, where $\Omega_i = a_i \{ b_i + a_{i+1} b_{i+1} [ h_{i+1} + a_{i+2} b_{i+2} (\ldots) ] \}$ with $a_i = \frac{1}{1 - \beta \pi_i (1 - \lambda_i)(1 - s_e)}$ and $b_i = \beta(1 - \pi_i)(1 - \lambda_{i+1})(1 - s_e)$ and until $i + n \leq O_T$. Thus, we have, e.g., $\Omega_{O_T} = \frac{h_{O_T}}{1 - \beta \pi_{O_T}(1 - \lambda_{O_T})(1 - s_e)}$ and $\Omega_{O_T-1} = \frac{1}{1 - \beta \pi_{O_T-1}(1 - \lambda_{O_T-1})(1 - s_e)} [ h_{O_T-1} + \frac{\beta(1 - \pi_{O_T-1})(1 - \lambda_{O_T})(1 - s_e)}{1 - \beta \pi_{O_T}(1 - \lambda_{O_T})(1 - s_e)} ]$...

## E.2 Model solution: a block recursive equilibrium

**Proposition 3.** The equilibrium is block recursive.

**Proof.** As in Menzio & Shi (2010), if we find a fixed point for $S_{O_T}(z, \epsilon)$, which is a function of choices at age $O_T$ (the terminal age) only, we then obtain $S_{O_T}(z, \epsilon)$, $\theta_{O_T}(z)$, $R_{O_T}(z)$, and $\epsilon_{O_T}(z)$ using equations (2), (3), and (4). Given these solutions for the labor market for age- $O_T$ workers, we can solve for the age- $O_{T-1}$ workers using the equation system given in definition 1 until age $i = Y$.  

\[ \square \]
E.3 Steady-state properties

At the steady-state, for age \( i \), the model must generate an age-pattern of transition rates such that

\[
JSR_i \approx s_e + (1 - s_e) \lambda_i G(R_i) > JSR_{i+1} \tag{17}
\]
\[
JFR_i \approx e_i p(\theta_i)[1 - G(R_i)] > JFR_{i+1} \tag{18}
\]

At the conditional steady state, we have (we omit \( z \) for the sake of simplifying the notations):

\[
\frac{c}{q(\theta_i)} = (1 - \gamma_i) \beta \pi_i \Sigma_i \quad (JC)
\]
\[
R_i = b + \Sigma_i - \Lambda_i - \Gamma_i(R_i) \quad (JD)
\]

where \( \Sigma_i, \Lambda_i \) and \( \Gamma_i(R_i) \) are given by (7), (8) and (9).

**Proposition 4.** In the data, we observe (i) by \( JSR_i > JSR_{i+1} \) and (ii) \( JFR_i > JFR_{i+1} \). (i) is compatible with the steady state equilibrium of the model if \( \frac{\lambda_{i+1}}{\lambda_i} < \frac{G(R_i)}{G(R_{i+1})} \), i.e. for a sufficiently flat age dynamic of \( \lambda_i \), allowing to rewrite \( JSR_i > JSR_{i+1} \) as \( R_i > R_{i+1} \). (ii) is compatible with the steady state equilibrium of the model if \( \{e_i, \theta_i\} > \{e_{i+1}, \theta_{i+1}\} \) and if the age pattern of search effort \( e \) and labor tightness \( \theta \) dominates the age profile of reservation productivity \( R \).

**Proof.** Assume for simplicity that \( \lambda_i = \lambda_{i+1} \), an extreme case where the age dynamic of \( \lambda_i \) is sufficiently flat. Straightforward from Equation (10) for \( R_i > R_{i+1} \). For \( JFR_i > JFR_{i+1} \), as \( R_i > R_{i+1} \), it is also straightforward from Equation (11) that \( e_i p(\theta_i) > e_{i+1} p(\theta_{i+1}) \) is needed. Given that \( \phi'(\epsilon_i(z)) = \frac{c_i \theta_i}{1 - \gamma_i} \), we deduce that \( e_i \) and \( \theta_i \) share the same dynamics. Hence \( \{e_i, \theta_i\} > \{e_{i+1}, \theta_{i+1}\} \) is needed. From Equation (11), it is obvious that the \( \{e_i, \theta_i\} > \{e_{i+1}, \theta_{i+1}\} \) may be not sufficient to compensate for \( R_i > R_{i+1} \). The job finding rate (Equation (18)) declines with worker age if the fall in \( e_i \) and \( \theta_i \) dominates the decline in \( R_i \); i.e. if \( [e_i p(\theta_i) - e_{i+1} p(\theta_{i+1})] \int_{R_{i+1}}^1 dG(x) > e_i p(\theta_i) \int_{R_{i+1}}^R dG(x) \).

As the value of a match is determined by a single variable, its surplus, the observed age-decreasing pattern of the worker flows may be puzzling. The following proposition decomposes the main forces at work in the agent behaviors.

**Proposition 5.** If the "search value" is larger than the "labor hoarding value", i.e. if \( \gamma_i e_i p(\theta_i) > (1 - s_e) \lambda_i \forall i, \) then \( R_i > R_{i+1} \). If the "horizon effect" dominates the "selection effect", i.e. if \( S_i > S_{i+1} \), and if human capital accumulation is moderate, then \( \{e_i, \theta_i\} > \{e_{i+1}, \theta_{i+1}\} \).

**Proof.** Under the restriction on \( \lambda_i \) given by Proposition 4, \( R_i > R_{i+1} \) ensures that \( JSR_i > JSR_{i+1} \). Using (20), we deduce that we have \( R_i > b \) as long as \( \Sigma_i > \Lambda_i + \Gamma_i(R_i) \). If we consider the marginal job, we have \( \Gamma_i(R_i) \to 0 \). Thus, a sufficient condition for \( R_i > R_{i+1} \) is \( \Sigma_i > \Lambda_i \). Using (7) and (8), this last condition becomes \( \gamma_i e_i p(\theta_i) > (1 - s_e) \lambda_i \forall i \).

From Equation (18), we deduce that the decline in the reservation productivity must be dominated by the a large decline in search efforts \( \{e_i, \theta_i\} \) in order to generate \( JFR_i > JFR_{i+1} \) (See Proposition 4). \( \{e_i, \theta_i\} \) are positively linked to the expected surplus \( S_i \). If \( R_i > R_{i+1} \), then \( S_i(e) = \Omega_i(e - R_i) \) (see appendix E.1). We have \( S_i = \int_{R_i}^1 S_i(x) dG(x) = \Omega_i \int_{R_i}^1 (x - R_i) dG(x) = \Omega_i \int_{R_i}^1 [1 - G(x)] dx \). Finally,
the age profile of the expected surplus can be defined as follows:

\[
\mathbb{S}_i - \mathbb{S}_{i+1} = (\Omega_i - \Omega_{i+1}) \int_{R_i} [1 - G(x)]dx - \Omega_{i+1} \int_{R_{i+1}} [1 - G(x)]dx
\]

"horizon effect"

"selection effect"

The expected surplus is age-decreasing when the horizon effect dominates the selection effect. A necessary condition is that the human capital accumulation is not too strong. Indeed, \(\Omega_i > \Omega_{i+1}\) iff

\[
R1: \quad \frac{h_{i+1} - h_i}{h_i} = \delta_i < \tilde{\delta}_i \equiv \frac{\beta(1 - \pi_i)(1 - \lambda_{i+1})(1 - s_e)}{1 - \beta(1 - \pi_i)(1 - \lambda_{i+1})(1 - s_e)}
\]

The restriction \(R1\) is necessary to get a decreasing age-pattern for the expected surplus. In this case \(\mathbb{S}_i > \mathbb{S}_{i+1}\), we have \(\{e_i; \theta_i\} > \{e_{i+1}; \theta_{i+1}\}\).

\[\square\]

### E.4 Stock-flow dynamics

#### E.4.1 Levels of employment and unemployment

The number of age-\(i\) workers employed during period \(t\) in a firm such that \(\tau \in [R_{i,t}, x]\), is \(n_i(z, x) = \int_{R_{i(z)}} \mu(\tau)d\tau\), where \(\mu(\tau)\) the number of firms with a productivity \(z\). This stock of jobs evolves as follows:

\[
n_Y(z', x) = \pi_Y \left[ \frac{(1 - s_e)\lambda_Y(m_Y - u_Y(z)) + e_Y(z)p(\theta_Y(z))u_Y(z)[G(x) - G(R_Y(z'))]}{+ (1 - s_e)(1 - \lambda_Y)[m_Y(z, x) - n_Y(z, R_Y(z'))]} \right]
\]

If \(i = Y\)

\[
n_i(z', x) = \pi_i \left[ \frac{(1 - s_e)\lambda_i(m_i - u_i(z)) + e_i(z)p(\theta_i(z))u_i(z)[G(x) - G(R_i(z'))]}{+ (1 - s_e)(1 - \lambda_i)[n_i(z, x) - n_i(z, R_i(z'))]} \right]
+ (1 - \pi_{i-1}) \left[ \frac{(1 - s_e)\lambda_{i+1}(m_{i-1} - u_{i-1}(z)) + e_i(z)p(\theta_i(z))u_{i-1}(z)[G(x) - G(R_i(z'))]}{+ (1 - s_e)(1 - \lambda_{i+1})[n_{i-1}(z, x) - n_{i-1}(z, R_i(z'))]} \right]
\]

where, as in Hairault et al. (2010), we assume that when worker ages (from \(i - 1\) to \(i\)), his job contact probability \((e_i(z)p(\theta_i(z)))\), and his reservation productivity \(R_i(z)\) are those of a worker of age \(i\).
E.4.2 Unemployment and employment rates

The dynamics of unemployment rates by age are given by

\[ u_i(z) = m_i - n_i(z, 1) \Leftrightarrow u_i^*(z) \equiv \frac{n_i(z)}{m_i} = 1 - \frac{n_i(z, 1)}{m_i} \equiv 1 - n_i^*(z, 1), \forall i, z. \]

The dynamics of employment rates are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
    n_Y^*(z', x) &= \pi_Y \left[ [(1 - s_e)\lambda_Y(1 - u_Y^*(z)) + c_Y(z)p(\theta_Y(z))u_Y^*(z)[G(x) - G(R_Y(z'))] \\
                      &\quad + (1 - s_e)(1 - \lambda_Y)n_Y^*(z, x) - n_Y^*(z, R_Y(z')) \right] \\
    \text{If } i \neq Y &\quad \pi_i \left[ [(1 - s_e)\lambda_i(1 - u_i^*(z)) + c_i(z)p(\theta_i(z))u_i^*(z)[G(x) - G(R_i(z'))] \\
                      &\quad + (1 - s_e)(1 - \lambda_i)n_i^*(z, x) - n_i^*(z, R_i(z')) \right] \\
                      &\quad + (1 - \pi_{i-1})\frac{m_{i-1}}{m_i} \left[ [(1 - s_e)\lambda_{i+1}(1 - u_{i-1}^*(z)) + c_i(z)p(\theta_i(z))u_{i-1}^*(z)[G(x) - G(R_i(z'))] \\
                      &\quad + (1 - s_e)(1 - \lambda_{i+1})n_{i+1}^*(z, x) - n_{i-1}^*(z, R_i(z')) \right]
\end{align*}
\]

Given equations (23) and (24), \( G(1) = 1 \) and \( u_i^*(z) = 1 - n_i^*(z, 1) \), we obtain for \( i = Y \) and \( i \neq Y \)

\[
\begin{align*}
    u_Y^*(z') &= \pi_Y \left[ [1 - c_Y(z)p(\theta_Y(z))(1 - G(R_Y(z')))]u_Y^*(z) \\
                      &\quad + (1 - s_e)(1 - \lambda_Y)n_Y^*(z, R_Y(z')) \\
                      &\quad + s_e + (1 - s_e)\lambda_YG(R_Y(z')) \right] \\
                      &\quad + (1 - \pi_{OT})\frac{m_{OT}}{m_Y} \quad \text{(25)}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
    u_i^*(z') &= \pi_i \left[ [1 - c_i(z)p(\theta_i(z))(1 - G(R_i(z')))]u_i^*(z) \\
                      &\quad + (1 - s_e)(1 - \lambda_i)n_i^*(z, R_i(z')) \\
                      &\quad + s_e + (1 - s_e)\lambda_iG(R_i(z')) \right] \\
                      &\quad + (1 - \pi_{i-1})\frac{m_{i-1}}{m_i} \left[ [1 - c_i(z)p(\theta_i(z))(1 - G(R_i(z')))]u_{i-1}^*(z) \\
                      &\quad + (1 - s_e)(1 - \lambda_{i+1})n_{i+1}^*(z, R_i(z')) \\
                      &\quad + s_e + (1 - s_e)\lambda_{i+1}G(R_i(z')) \right] \quad \text{(26)}
\end{align*}
\]

Unemployed workers of age \( i \) in period \( t + 1 \) are those of age \( i \) in period \( t \) who do not age, and

- who do not find a job (first term of the first line of the right-hand side of equations (25) and (26)),
- employed workers of age \( i \) who lose their job in period \( t + 1 \) due to a change in aggregate productivity leading to a change in the reservation productivity. When \( R_i(z) < R_i(z') \), the number of obsolete jobs depends on job creations over the past. Obviously, if \( R_i(z) > R_i(z') \), these jobs do not exist. (second term of the first line),
- the age-\( i \) employed workers who lose their jobs due to a separation, which can result from an exogenous reason with a probability \( s_e \) and from endogenous decisions with a probability \((1 - s_e)\lambda_iG(R_i(z'))\) (first term of the second line),
- and new participants (last term of the second line).

Due to aging for those unemployed of age-\( i \), there is a number of unemployed aged age-\( i - 1 \) who age without finding a job (the last lines of (26)). Note that unemployment dynamics are a function of \( n_i(z, R_i(z')) \) and \( n_{i-1}(z, R_i(z')) \), which are themselves function of past values of unemployment. This underlines the interdependence between age-\( i \) unemployment stock and unemployment level at previous age \( i - 1 \). Average unemployment rate is: \( u_i^* = \sum_{t=1}^{T} u_{i,t} \).
E.4.3 Transition rates

The job finding rate \( JFR_i(z) \) and the job separation rate \( JSR_i(z) \) are respectively:

\[
JFR_i(z) = \frac{e_i(z)p(\theta_i(z))(1 - G(R_i(z')))[\pi_iu_i^r(z) + (1 - \pi_i-1)\frac{m_{i-1}}{m_i}u_{i-1}^r(z)]}{u_i^r(z)}
\]

\[
JSR_i(z) = \frac{(1 - s_e)(1 - \lambda_i)\left[\pi_in_i^r(z, R_i(z')) + (1 - \pi_i-1)\frac{m_{i-1}}{m_i}n_{i-1}^r(z, R_i(z'))\right]}{n_i^r(z, 1)} + \frac{[s_e + (1 - s_e)\lambda_iG(R_i(z'))]\left[\pi_i(1 - u_i^r(z)) + (1 - \pi_i-1)\frac{m_{i-1}}{m_i}(1 - u_{i-1}^r(z))\right]}{n_i^r(z, 1)}
\]

In the basic infinite horizon model, we have \( \pi_i = 1, \forall i, m_i = 1, \) and \( n_i(z, R_i(z')) = n_{i-1}(z, R_i(z')) = 0 \) leading to \( JFR_i(z) = e_i(z)p(\theta(z))(1 - G(R(z')) \) and \( JSR_i(z) = s_e + (1 - s_e)\lambda_iG(R(z')) \). These definitions of worker flows have an empirical counterpart and are used by Fujita & Ramey (2012) to test the ability of the MP model to match labor market features. In the data, it is only possible to detect the worker’s age before a labor market transition. Thus, we compute the transition rate conditionally on being of a given age prior to the labor market transition. In this case, all workers have “the same” age in our measure of the transition rates by age. The counterparts in the model are:

\[
JFR_i(z) = e_i(z)p(\theta_i(z))[1 - G(R_i(z'))]
\]

\[
JSR_i(z) = \frac{(1 - s_e)(1 - \lambda_i)n_i^r(z, R_i(z')) + [s_e + (1 - s_e)\lambda_iG(R_i(z'))]n_i^r(z, 1)}{n_i^r(z, 1)}
\]

where \( n_i^r(z, 1) = 1 - u_i^r(z) \). We use this usual approximation of the worker flows per age in order to measure the ability of the theory to explain the observed data, computed using the same formula.

E.5 The derivation of the model elasticity to the business cycle

In order to decompose the impact of the aggregate productivity shock on \( \{\theta_i, e_i, R_i\} \), we consider the following system:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\text{JC}) \quad \frac{\epsilon}{q(\theta(z))} & = \beta\pi_i J_i(z) \\
J_i(z) & = zh_iX(R_i(z)) - w_i(z) + (1 - \gamma_i)[(1 - G(R_i(z)))\Lambda_i(z) + \Gamma_i(z)] \\
w_i(z) & = \gamma_i z h_i X(R_i(z)) + (1 - \gamma_i) (bh_i + \Sigma_i(z))(1 - G(R_i(z))) \\
(\text{JD}) \quad \frac{z h_i R_i(z)}{1} & = w_i(z, R_i(z)) - (1 - \gamma_i)[\Lambda_i(z) + \Gamma_i(z, R_i(z))] \\
w_i(z, R_i(z)) & = \gamma_i z h_i R_i(z) + (1 - \gamma_i) (bh_i + \Sigma_i(z))
\end{align*}
\]

where \( J_i(z) = \int_{R_i(z)}^{1} J_i(z, x) dG(x) \), \( w_i(z) = \int_{R_i(z)}^{1} w_i(z, x) dG(x) \), \( X(R_i(z)) = \int_{R_i(z)}^{1} x dG(x) \) and \( \Gamma_i(z) = \int_{R_i(z)}^{1} \Gamma_i(z, x) dG(x) \). The decision rule on \( \theta \) leads to \( p(\theta_i(z)) \int_{R_i(z)}^{1} S_i(z, x) dG(x) = \frac{1}{(1 - \gamma_i)\beta\pi_i c \theta_i(z)} \).
The decision rule on $e$ leads to $\varphi'(e_i(z)) = \frac{\gamma_i}{1 - \gamma_i} c \theta_i(z)$. Using the functional form, we obtain

$$
\frac{e_i(z)^{1 + \varphi}}{1 + \varphi} = \frac{1}{1 + \varphi} \frac{\gamma_i}{1 - \gamma_i} c e_i(z) \theta_i(z) \Rightarrow \hat{e}_i(z) = \frac{1}{\varphi} \hat{\theta}_i(z)
$$

Given the solution for the surplus (see appendix E.1), we have $S_i(z, \epsilon) = \Omega_i z (\epsilon - R_i(z))$, implying $\overline{S}_i(z) = \Omega_i z I(R_i(z))$, where $I(R_i(z)) = \int_{R_i(z)}^{1} (1 - G(x)) dx$, and thus $\overline{S}_i(z) = \hat{z} - \epsilon I_i R_i(z)$, where $\epsilon I_i R_i = \left| \frac{d I}{d R} \right|$. Finally, given the free entry condition, the FOC with respect to $e$ and the solution for the surplus, the implied solution for $\Sigma_i(z)$, $\Lambda_i(z)$, and $\Gamma^*_i(z)$, are

$$
\Sigma_i(z) = c \left[ \frac{\gamma_i}{1 - \gamma_i} \frac{\varphi}{1 + \varphi} e_i(z) \theta_i(z) \right] + \frac{1 - \pi_i}{\pi_i + \gamma_i} e_{i+1}(z) \theta_{i+1}(z) \right]
$$

$$
\Lambda_i(z) = (1 - s_e)c \left[ \frac{\lambda_i}{1 - \gamma_i} \theta_i(z) \right] + \frac{1 - \pi_i}{\pi_i + \gamma_i} \theta_{i+1}(z)
$$

$$
\Gamma^*_i(z) = \beta (1 - s_e)(1 - \pi_i)(1 - \lambda_i) \Omega_{i+1} z (R_i(z) - R_{i+1}(z))
$$

Hence, log-linear approximation of equilibrium consists of the approximation of $(JC)-(JD)$ systems. For the $(JC)$ curve, we have:

$$
(JC) \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\hat{\theta}_i = \frac{1}{1 - \eta} \hat{\lambda}_i \\
\hat{J}_i = \frac{z h_i X(R_i(z)) - u_i \theta_i(z)}{z h_i X(R_i(z)) - u_i} \hat{z} - \frac{\Sigma_i(1 - G(R_i(z)))}{z h_i X(R_i(z)) - u_i} \hat{R}_i \\
\hat{\xi}_i = \gamma \frac{z h_i X(R_i(z)) - u_i \theta_i(z)}{z h_i X(R_i(z)) - u_i} \hat{z} + (1 - \gamma) \frac{\Sigma_i(1 - G(R_i(z)))}{z h_i X(R_i(z)) - u_i} \hat{R}_i
\end{array} \right.
$$

Using the approximation $\frac{1 - \pi_i}{\pi_i + \gamma_i} \to 0$ that allows us to obtain $\Lambda_i(z) = \beta (1 - s_e) \pi_i \lambda_i \frac{J_i(z)}{1 - \eta}$, leading to $J_i(z) = \frac{z h_i e(R_i(z)) - u_i \theta_i(z)}{(1 - \beta(1 - s_e) \pi_i \lambda_i) \frac{J_i(z)}{1 - \eta}}$ and $\hat{\Lambda}_i = \hat{\lambda}_i$, we deduce:

$$
\hat{J}_i = \frac{z h_i X(R_i(z))}{z h_i X(R_i(z)) - (b h_i + \Sigma_i)(1 - G(R_i(z)))} \hat{z} - \frac{\Sigma_i(1 - G(R_i(z)))}{z h_i X(R_i(z)) - (b h_i + \Sigma_i)(1 - G(R_i(z)))} \hat{\Sigma}_i
$$

Hence, Log-linear approximation of the $(JD)$ system is given by:

$$
(JD) \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\hat{\xi}_i = \frac{z h_i X(R_i(z))}{z h_i X(R_i(z)) - (b h_i + \Sigma_i)(1 - G(R_i(z)))} \hat{z} + \frac{\Sigma_i(1 - G(R_i(z)))}{z h_i X(R_i(z)) - (b h_i + \Sigma_i)(1 - G(R_i(z)))} \hat{\Sigma}_i
\end{array} \right.
$$

where $\Gamma^*_i(z, R_i(z)) = \beta (1 - s_e)(1 - \pi_i)(1 - \lambda_{i+1}) S_{i+1}(z, R_i(z))$, leading to $\hat{\Gamma}^*_i \approx \hat{R}_i$, given the equation of the surplus. The $(JD)$ system then leads to

$$
\hat{R}_i = -\frac{b h_i + \Sigma_i}{b h_i + \Sigma_i + \Gamma_i} \hat{z} + \frac{\Sigma_i + \hat{\Sigma}_i - \Lambda_i}{b h_i + \Sigma_i + \Gamma_i} \hat{\Lambda}_i
$$

Given that Log-linear approximations of the free entry condition and FOC with respect to $e$ lead to $\hat{\Sigma}_i \approx \frac{1 + \varphi}{\varphi} \hat{\theta}_i$ and $\hat{\Lambda}_i \approx \eta \hat{\theta}_i$ respectively, we deduce that $\hat{\Sigma}_i > \hat{\Lambda}_i$. 

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Using the free-entry condition \( \frac{G(R)}{\sigma x} = (1 - \gamma_i) \beta \pi_i \), which leads to \( \eta \hat{\theta}_i = \gamma_i \hat{\sigma}_i \), which leads to \( \gamma_i \hat{\sigma}_i \approx \hat{\gamma}_i \approx \frac{1}{\eta} \left[ z - \epsilon R \hat{R}_i(z) \right] \), the FOC on the search effort, which leads to \( \hat{e}_i(z) = \frac{1}{\phi} \hat{\theta}_i(z) \), the Log-approximation of the "search value" \( \hat{\sigma}_i \approx \frac{1 + \epsilon}{\phi} \hat{\theta}_i \) and the one of the "labor hoarding value \( \hat{\Lambda}_i \approx \eta \hat{\theta}_i \), we deduce from the JD system \( \hat{R}_i \approx -\frac{b + \Sigma_i - \Lambda_i - \Gamma_i}{b + \Sigma_i - \Lambda_i} \hat{z} + \frac{\Sigma_i + 1}{b + \Sigma_i - \Lambda_i} \hat{\theta}_i \), under the assumption that when \( \frac{1 - \gamma_i}{\gamma_i} \rightarrow 0 \), we also have \( \theta_i \rightarrow 0 \). Hence, we find the system of equations (31), (32) and (33).

The log-linear approximation of the equilibrium (Definition 1) is given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{R}_i & \approx -\mathcal{M}_i \hat{z} \\
\hat{\theta}_i & \approx \frac{1}{\eta} \left[ 1 + \epsilon_{R|R} \mathcal{M}_i \right] \hat{z} \\
\hat{e}_i & \approx \frac{1}{\phi} \left[ 1 + \epsilon_{R|R} \mathcal{M}_i \right] \hat{z}
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \epsilon_{R|R} = \left| \frac{G(R)}{R} \right| \), with \( I(R) = \int_R^1 (1 - G(x)) dx \) and \( \mathcal{M}_i = \frac{b_i + \Sigma_i (1 - 1 + \epsilon_{R|R})}{b_i + \Sigma_i (1 - 1 + \epsilon_{R|R}) - \Lambda_i (1 + \epsilon_{R|R})} \).

**Proposition 6.** If the restrictions in Propositions 4 and 5 are satisfied, volatilities of transition rates are age-increasing, which is consistent with the data.

**Proof.** If the restrictions in Proposition 5 is satisfied, implying that \( \Sigma_i > \Sigma_{i+1} \) and \( \Sigma_i > \Lambda_i, \forall i \), and given that \( \frac{\partial \mathcal{M}_i}{\partial \Sigma_i} < 0 \) for any \( x_i \in (0;1) \) such that \( \Lambda_i = x_i \Sigma_i \), we conclude that \( \hat{R}_{i+1} < \hat{R}_i \). The same arguments apply for \( \hat{\theta}_{i+1} < \hat{\theta}_i \) and \( \hat{e}_{i+1} > \hat{e}_i \) using equations (32) and (33). The age profile of worker flows are given by \( \tilde{JF} \hat{R}_i \approx \hat{e}_i + (1 - \eta) \hat{\theta}_i - \frac{G(R)}{G(R)} \epsilon G(R) \hat{R}_i \) and \( \tilde{JS} \hat{R}_i \approx \frac{(1 - s_{e}) \Lambda_i G(R)_{s_{e} + (1 - s_{e}) \Lambda_i G(R)}}{s_{e} + (1 - s_{e}) \Lambda_i G(R)} \epsilon G(R) \hat{R}_i \), where \( \epsilon_{G(R)} \) denotes the elasticity of function \( G \) with respect to \( R \). Equations (31), (32), and (33) lead to \( \tilde{JF} \hat{R}_i \approx \frac{1 + (1 - \eta)}{\phi} \left( 1 + \epsilon_{R|R} \mathcal{M}_i \right) \hat{z} + \tilde{JS} \hat{R}_i \approx -\frac{(1 - s_{e}) \Lambda_i G(R)_{s_{e} + (1 - s_{e}) \Lambda_i G(R)}}{s_{e} + (1 - s_{e}) \Lambda_i G(R)} \epsilon G(R) \mathcal{M}_i \hat{z} \). Given that the restrictions in Proposition 5 implies that \( \mathcal{M}_i \) increases with worker age because \( \Sigma_i > \Sigma_{i+1}, \Sigma_i > \Lambda_i \), and \( \frac{\partial \mathcal{M}_i}{\partial \Sigma_i} < 0 \) \( \forall i \), we deduce that \( \tilde{JS} \hat{R}_i < \tilde{JS} \hat{R}_{i+1} \). For the dynamics of the finding rates, we have:

\[
\tilde{JF} \hat{R}_{i+1} - \tilde{JF} \hat{R}_i = \left[ \frac{1 + (1 - \eta)}{\phi} \epsilon_{R|R} \mathcal{M}_i + \frac{G(R)}{G(R)} \epsilon G(R) \mathcal{M}_i \right] \hat{z}
\]

Using the restrictions in Proposition 4, \( \mathcal{M}_{i+1} - \mathcal{M}_i > 0 \) dominates \( \int_{R_{i+1}}^{R_i} dG(x) > 0 \).

Proposition 6 shows that the restrictions for which the model can reproduce the shape of worker transitions per age at the steady state ensure that the age-pattern of their volatility is also matched.

**F Numerical algorithm**

In order to solve the model, we extend Fujita & Ramey (2012)'s algorithm along 2 dimensions. First, we take into account endogenous search effort, which was not included in Fujita & Ramey
(2012)’s paper. Secondly, we include life-cycle features (while Fujita & Ramey (2012) look at an infinitely-lived representative agent).

The model has three exogenous state variables: worker’s age \( i \), match-specific productivity \( \epsilon \) and aggregate productivity \( z \). For the grid of the match-specific productivity \( \epsilon \), we do not follow Fujita & Ramey (2012): its highest value \( h \) is set to sufficient large value to generate mean match productivity of 1, given that \( G(\epsilon) \) is approximated by a discrete distribution with support \( X = \{x_1, \ldots, x_M\} \), satisfying \( x_1 = 1/M \), \( x_m - x_{m-1} = x_M/M \). The associated probabilities \( \{g_1, \ldots, g_M\} \) are \( g_m = g(x_m)/M \) for \( m = 1, \ldots, M - 1 \), where \( g(x) \) is the Log-normal density, and \( g_M = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{M-1} g_i \).

For the aggregate shock, we also follow Fujita & Ramey (2012) in order to represent the process \( z_t \) as a Markov chain with a state space \( Z = \{z_1, \ldots, z_I\} \). The transition matrix of this process is \( \Pi_z = [\pi_{ij}^z] \), where \( \pi_{ij}^z = Pr(z_{t+1} = z_j | z_t = z_i) \). We then form two transition matrices: first, the matrix \( \Pi_{z,\epsilon} = [\pi_{ij}^{z,\epsilon}] \) where \( \pi_{ij}^{z,\epsilon} = Pr(z_{t+1} = z_j | z_t = z_i) \gamma_m \), which gives the joint probability when both aggregate and match-specific shocks can change simultaneously, and second, the matrix \( \Pi_z = [\pi_{ij}^z] \), where \( \pi_{ij}^z = Pr(z_{t+1} = z_j | z_t = z_i) \Pi_m \), which gives the probability when only aggregate shock can change, for each level of match-specific productivity.

Solving recursively, starting from the oldest worker \( O_T \). Let \( S_{OT} \) the vector \( [S(x_1, z_1), \ldots, S(x_M, z_1), \ldots, S(x_1, z_I), \ldots, S(x_M, z_I)] \), and \( R \) be the vector \( Z \otimes X \). Then, for an initial guess for \( e_{OT}(z) \) and \( \theta_{OT}(z) \), we find the fixed point of

\[
S_{OT} = \max \left\{ R - z + \pi_{OT} \beta \left[ \lambda_{OT} \Pi_{z,\epsilon} S_{OT} + (1 - \lambda_{OT}) \Pi_z S_{OT} - \Pi_{z,\epsilon} S_{OT} e_{OT} \right] ; 0 \right\}
\]

where \( \Pi_{z,\epsilon} S_{OT} \) is deduced from the definition of the opposite of the search value, which is \( \phi(e_{OT}) - \gamma_{OT} e_{OT} P(\theta_{OT}) \pi_{OT} \beta S_{OT} \). At each iteration, we use the FOC with respect to \( e \) to substitute \( \phi(e_{OT}) \) by \( \frac{1}{1 - \gamma_{OT}} \gamma_{OT} e_{OT} P(\theta_{OT}) \pi_{OT} \beta S_{OT} \). When convergence criteria are satisfied, we obtain the decision rules \( \theta_{OT}^*(z), e_{OT}^*(z) \) and \( R_{OT}^*(z) \), and the optimal value for the surplus \( S_{OT}^*(x, z) \), \( \forall z \) and \( \forall x \).

Working backward, by looking at worker aged \( O_{T-1} \). For \( i = O_{T-1} \), we solve the same problem, except that we integrate the solution for the age \( i = O_T \) in the agents’ expectations. Then, we find the fixed point of

\[
S_{OT-1} = \max \left\{ R - z + \pi_{OT-1} \beta \left[ \lambda_{OT-1} \Pi_{z,\epsilon} S_{OT-1} + (1 - \lambda_{OT-1}) \Pi_z S_{OT-1} - \Pi_{z,\epsilon} S_{OT-1} e_{OT} \right] ; 0 \right\}
\]

which gives, when the convergence criteria are satisfied, \( \{\theta_{OT-1}^*(z), e_{OT-1}^*(z), R_{OT-1}^*(z)\} \), and \( S_{OT-1}^*(x, z) \), \( \forall z \) and \( \forall x \).

Working backward. We repeat the procedure until \( i = Y \). Given this complete set of decision rules, we can simulate the Markov chain for \( JFR \) and \( JSR \) and get the theoretical distribution of the employment per age, using equations (2), (4) and (3).
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